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ARTICLE 
Material Facts in the Debate over 
Twombly and Iqbal 
Jonah B. Gelbach* 
Abstract. This Article presents empirical evidence concerning the adjudication of 
defendant-filed summary judgment motions. Using nearly 2000 randomly selected 
employment discrimination and contract cases, the Article tries to assess the performance 
of Twombly and Iqbal, which raised the federal pleading standard, in filtering cases 
according to merit. This Article begins by explaining how such data might be helpful in 
making such an assessment, taking into account the possibility that parties’ behavior 
might have changed following Twombly and Iqbal.  
This Article ultimately concludes that even using this large collection of data—the most 
comprehensive data assembled to date on the subject—it is not possible to determine 
whether “Twiqbal1’s” supporters or critics are more accurate in their assessments of the 
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efficacy of the new plausibility pleading regime with respect to its ability to filter cases 
according to merit at the prediscovery stage. This null result points to the very real 
possibility that plausibility pleading’s case-quality effects—a quintessential empirical 
question—simply cannot be answered using data. 
This Article’s basic message, then, is that empirical evidence is unlikely to settle the debate 
over the case-quality effects of the new pleading regime ushered in by Twombly and Iqbal. 
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Introduction 
Much controversy has surrounded the Supreme Court’s opinions in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.2 Critics of the plausibility 
standard introduced through these cases argue that it will reduce access to the 
federal courts for meritorious suits.3 In some disputes, the critics argue, the 
defendant controls the information that would be necessary to plead in 
sufficient factual detail to meet the plausibility standard. Under Conley v. 
Gibson’s now-retired “no set of facts” pleading standard,4 plaintiffs could allege 
wrongdoing generally and then rely on discovery to unearth the facts 
necessary to establish the elements of such causes of action. By requiring 
plaintiffs to allege such facts before Rule 12(b)(6) adjudication,5 critics argue, 
Twiqbal1’s plausibility standard establishes a catch-22: pleading sufficiently to 
reach discovery requires access to information that is available only through 
discovery.6 
On the other side of the “Twiqbal1” debate, supporters of the plausibility 
standard argue that too many plaintiffs intentionally bring low-merit lawsuits 
for settlement value only. According to this view, defendants must agree to pay 
off plaintiffs in such cases because the burden of discovery is greater for 
defendants than for plaintiffs. Thus, plaintiffs in such suits have little 
disincentive to proceed through discovery, leaving defendants to choose 
between either settling beforehand or bearing the high discovery costs that 
precede the summary judgment phase where the defendants are very likely to 
win. Supporters of the switch to Twiqbal1’s plausibility standard believe it will 
help eliminate low-merit cases, whose plaintiffs, they believe, will be unable to 
plead with sufficient factual detail before discovery costs mount.  
 
 1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 2. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 3. For purposes of this Article, a case has merit if, following discovery, there would be 
sufficient facts that either (i) are in dispute, or (ii) point in the plaintiff1’s favor if not in 
dispute, such that the defendant would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
That is, a case has merit if, following discovery, its factual posture would either present 
an issue of triable fact or entitle the plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law. To put it 
another way, a case has merit if, following discovery, the plaintiff could demonstrate 
that she would be able to meet her burden of production at trial. Given this definition 
of merit, it is possible for even meritorious suits to fail the plausibility pleading 
standard. A judge deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion might believe that the complaint’s 
allegations are implausible, so that she grant the motions, even though it happens to be 
true that discovery, were it to occur, would turn up evidence sufficient to meet the 
plaintiff1’s burden of production. 
 4. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 
 5. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 6. For an interesting discussion of the challenges in designing a pleading standard that 
accounts both for such catch-22-style asymmetries and for the possibility that pretrial 
litigation costs are asymmetric in the opposite direction, see Paul Stancil, Balancing the 
Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90 (2009).  
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Both the critics and the supporters hold theoretically coherent views: 
logically, both views could be correct. Further, it is possible that there are 
sizable numbers of both meritorious cases likely to face a catch-22 problem 
under the plausibility standard and strike suits likely to be filtered out by the 
plausibility standard. Therefore, the question as to which effect predominates 
ultimately is an empirical one. 
While there has been no shortage of empirical work on Twiqbal, it has 
overwhelmingly focused on the question whether judges have indeed applied a 
higher standard when adjudicating Rule 12(b)(6) motions.7 But almost no work 
besides the present Article has even attempted to measure the extent to which 
 
 7. See, e.g., JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO 
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2011), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup 
/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf [hereinafter FJC FIRST STUDY]; JOE S. CECIL 
ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS GRANTED 
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
ON CIVIL RULES (2011), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal2.pdf 
/$file/motioniqbal2.pdf [hereinafter FJC SECOND STUDY]; Raymond H. Brescia, The 
Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing 
Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235 (2011-2012); Scott Dodson, A New Look: 
Dismissal Rates of Federal Civil Claims, 96 JUDICATURE 127 (2012); Patricia W. Hatamyar, 
The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553 
(2010); Lonny Hoffman, Rulemaking in the Age of Twombly and Iqbal, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1483 (2013); William H.J. Hubbard, Testing for Change in Procedural Standards, with 
Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (2013); Patricia Hatamyar 
Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 603 (2012); Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A Social Psychological Study 
of Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2011); 
Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117 
(2015); Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95 (2010) [hereinafter Seiner, 
Pleading Disability]; Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading 
Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011; Kendall W. 
Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly?: A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic      
Corp. v. Twombly on 121(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008); Joe S. Cecil, 
Of Waves and Water: A Response to Comments on the FJC Study Motions to Dismiss for 
Failure to State a Claim After Iqbal (Mar. 19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026103; see also Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, 
Plaintiphobia in the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 193, 195-96 (2014) (reporting 
trends in “the difference between . . . pretrial-adjudication judgment rates for the 
defendant and for the plaintiff1” and associating these trends with the Supreme Court’s 
“trilogy” of summary judgment cases as well as Twombly and Iqbal1); Samuel     
Issacharoff & Geoffrey Miller, An Information-Forcing Approach to the Motion to Dismiss, 
5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 437, 439, 452 (2013) (proposing “a use of fee and cost shifting in the 
initial process of factual claiming and denials that would create incentives for the 
parties to acquire or reveal information germane to the motion to dismiss by forcing 
them to absorb the costs of either producing the information or denying its existence” 
and engaging in “a mild empirical inquiry” to determine how much such a policy might 
matter (capitalization altered)); Roger Michalski & Abby K. Wood, Twombly and Iqbal 
at the State Level (USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 14-30, 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2468864 (using data from states to conduct before-
after comparisons of the sort other authors have done at the federal level). 
Material Facts in the Debate over Twombly and Iqbal 
68 STAN. L. REV. 369 (2016) 
374 
Twiqbal has affected the merit of cases that proceed beyond the Rule 12(b)(6) 
stage.8  
This Article takes up that task, using outcomes of defense summary 
judgment motions to attempt to measure Twiqbal1’s effects on case quality. 
More specifically, the analysis defines a case as having no merit postdiscovery 
if a reasonable factfinder could not find for the plaintiff on the basis of the 
postdiscovery record.9 Defendants in such cases can be expected to file and win 
summary judgment motions. Assuming that the plausibility pleading standard 
is effective at snagging low-merit cases at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, such no-merit 
cases will be eliminated from the set of cases that make it to summary 
judgment in the post-Iqbal period. Thus, (i) there should be fewer cases in the 
summary judgment population post-Iqbal, and (ii) those cases should be more 
likely to survive summary judgment. Consequently, the plaintiff1’s win rate 
against defense summary judgment motions should be greater following 
Twiqbal than before. On the other hand, if Twiqbal1’s critics are correct, then the 
plaintiff1’s win rate will have either dropped (indicating that Twiqbal filters out 
higher-quality, rather than lower-quality, cases) or stayed the same (indicating 
that Twiqbal filters equal proportions of high- and low-quality cases).  
In reality, things are more complicated. There are good reasons to believe 
that parties’ case strategy and Rule 12(b)(6)-motion-filing behavior, as well as 
their inclination to settle, will change following a perceived change in the 
pleading standard.10 Accordingly, Part I.D also discusses the role such party 
selection effects play in the empirical analysis.  
 
 8. Alexander Reinert has written two article that in whole or in part are directed toward 
this question. Reinert’s Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, supra note 7, focuses 
primarily on the same question that most of the Twiqbal empirical literature has 
considered—how the outcomes of Rule 12(b)(6) motions themselves have changed. 
However, the article also includes a brief section, titled “Plausibility Pleading as Filter?,” 
based on Reinert’s coding of post-Rule 12(b)(6) outcomes in the cases he studies. 
Reinert, supra note 7, at 2162 (italics omitted). I discuss this article further below in  
Part V.A. In the other article, Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 
IND. L.J. 119 (2011), Reinert attempts to measure the effects that a heightened pleading 
standard would have had on the ultimate dispensation of pre-Twombly cases that had 
Rule 12(b)(6) motions granted and then reversed on appeal. By design, this article uses 
only pre-Twombly cases, so it cannot provide information about cases that are actually 
litigated after the switch to Twiqbal1’s plausibility pleading standard. Moreover, by 
coding cases that settle as meritorious, id. at 138, Reinert begs the very question raised 
by supporters of the plausibility pleading standard: whether settlements occur because 
of the threat of costly discovery rather than the presence of a genuine basis for suit.  
 9. See supra note 3. Part I.B further elaborates on this definition. 
 10. See Jonah B. Gelbach, Can the Dark Arts of the Dismal Science Shed Light on the Empirical 
Reality of Civil Procedure?, 2 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 223, 228 (2014) [hereinafter 
Gelbach, Dark Arts]; Hubbard, supra note 7, at 36; Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the 
Doors to Discovery?: Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 
YALE L.J. 2270, 2277 (2012) [hereinafter Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery?]. For 
discussions of changes in party behavior induced by changing pleading standards under 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, see Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter 
footnote continued on next page 
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A critical question that arises in this discussion is whether there are any 
disputes that “select into summary judgment,” in the sense that they would 
develop into lawsuits that ultimately face summary judgment motions under 
Twiqbal, but not under the pre-Twiqbal pleading standard. While 
counterintuitive, the possibility that some such lawsuits exist is real.11 This 
possibility is important because the empirical approach adopted in this Article 
to measure the quality-filtering effect of Twiqbal requires the assumption that 
there are no such cases—an underlying premise subsequently referred to as the 
“no-selection-into-summary-judgment” assumption. This assumption is strong 
in that it amounts to a restriction on the scope of party selection effects. 
Without the assumption, differences in the plaintiff1’s win rate at summary 
judgment involve not only the quality-filtering effect discussed above, but also 
a component related to the quality of cases that are selected into summary 
judgment as a result of Twiqbal.  
If there were such a mixture of quality filtering among some cases and 
selection among others, it would be impossible to use empirical evidence to 
isolate Twiqbal1’s quality-filtering effects. For example, a finding of no change in 
the plaintiff1’s win rate at summary judgment would be consistent with either 
no quality-filtering effect and no selection effect or a large quality-filtering 
effect that is exactly counteracted by a large selection effect operating in the 
opposite direction. In such a situation, neither possibility can be ruled out. 
Consequently, it would be impossible to assess commentators’ claims about 
Twiqbal1’s quality-filtering effects in particular. Thus, the no-selection-into-
summary-judgment assumption is necessary to assess commentators’ claims 
about Twiqbal1’s effects on the mix of cases that make it past the Rule 12(b)(6) 
stage.12  
Finally, as to the no-selection-into-summary-judgment assumption, I note 
that it is partially testable. If this assumption is correct, then Twiqbal would 
have eliminated some cases from the set facing summary judgment motions 
while not causing any new cases to face summary judgment motions. Thus, 
Twiqbal would have to reduce the share of filed cases that face summary 
judgment motions, all else being equal. If the no-selection-into-summary-
 
Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598 (2007); and 
Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 35 (2009). 
 11. Because the details are a bit involved, they are deferred to Part I.D.2. In short, though, 
such a lawsuit need only satisfy two counterfactual conditions. First, if it were 
adjudicated under the old pleading standard, the lawsuit would be settled relatively 
early—before the answer/Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Second, if this lawsuit were adjudicated 
under the Twiqbal pleading standard, the parties would fail to settle after all, with the 
defendant then filing a summary judgment motion after discovery. 
 12. On the unavoidable role of making behavioral assumptions in empirical research about 
human behavior, including the effects of changes in legal rules, see Gelbach, Dark Arts, 
supra note 10, at 248-49. 
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judgment assumption is correct, then there should have been a drop in the 
share of cases facing summary judgment motions following Twiqbal. 
The empirical work in this Article is based on a random sample of cases in 
which defendants filed Rule 56 summary judgment motions. This sample was 
created using a unique database of docket reports.13 To construct the dataset, all 
civil cases filed in the federal district courts in the periods of October 1, 2005 to 
June 30, 2006 (the pre-Twombly period) and October 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010 (the 
post-Iqbal period) were combed to find those which had at least one motion for 
summary judgment filed.14 After restricting attention to cases with a PACER 
code indicating that the nature of the suit was employment discrimination or 
contracts, cases were then sampled randomly from these two periods.15  
This Article focuses its analysis on employment discrimination and 
contract cases for a simple reason: employment discrimination cases may hinge 
on the underlying motivation for an employer’s adverse action, and these 
motivations may be difficult for an employee to ascertain without discovery. 
Thus, employment discrimination cases are relatively likely to involve the 
catch-22 information asymmetry problem embodied by what I call the 
“aggressive critics’ view.”16 By contrast, it seems reasonable to think that 
plaintiffs should be able to plead the bases for a breach of contract claim 
without the benefit of discovery. Thus, the aggressive critics’ view of Twiqbal 
seems unlikely to hold in the contract litigation setting.  
Somewhat unsatisfyingly, the results of the analysis in both contexts 
ultimately illustrates that empirics cannot conclusively resolve the case-quality 
aspects of the Twiqbal debate. The results for employment discrimination cases 
are statistically insignificant and generate wide confidence intervals. This fact 
suggests that data for employment discrimination cases do not allow us to 
distinguish between very different views about Twiqbal. For contract cases, 
there is relatively weak evidence in favor of an increase in the quality of cases 
that make it to summary judgment due to Twiqbal. However, for this category 
of cases, the data indicate that there is reason to doubt the assumption that 
there is no selection into summary judgment.17 In context, this means that the 
Twiqbal-induced change in the plaintiff win rate likely measures a combination 
of both (i) the case-quality effects of interest, and (ii) case quality among cases 
that select into summary judgment as a result of Twiqbal. This dual causality 
creates uncertainty as to whether the results for contract cases truly address the 
central debate over Twiqbal1’s effects on case quality. 
 
 13. Part II discusses the source of these data in more detail. 
 14. These are the filing periods used in the reports by FJC researchers. See FJC FIRST STUDY, 
supra note 7, at 5. 
 15. Current and/or recently graduated law students then downloaded relevant case 
documents for the sampled cases and coded them. 
 16. See infra Part I.C. 
 17. The basis for such doubt is a bit involved and is explained in detail in Part IV.B.3.  
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These results underscore a disappointing but unavoidable fact: there are 
some empirical questions that cannot be clearly answered using feasible data. 
This Article’s basic message, then, is that data are unlikely to settle the debate 
over the case-quality effects of the new pleading regime ushered in by Twombly 
and Iqbal.18 
Part I of this Article discusses the methodological ideas that underpin the 
Article’s analysis. Part II describes the data in detail. Parts III and IV present 
empirical results for employment discrimination and contract cases, 
respectively. Part V discusses some further methodological considerations and 
challenges. 
I. Twombly, Iqbal, and What We Can Learn from Summary 
Judgment Results 
A. The Evolution of Pleading Standards and How They Relate to 
Discovery 
Before Twombly, Conley v. Gibson set the standard for Rule 12(b)(6) motions 
to dismiss in federal courts. According to Conley1: “[A] complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle 
him to relief.”19 This standard is both objective and relatively easy to satisfy.  
In the half century between Conley and Twombly, a number of lower courts 
imposed effective pleading standards more demanding than Conley’s no-set-of-
facts standard.20 In response, the Supreme Court more than once reversed 
courts of appeals, affirming the Conley standard in no uncertain terms. One 
 
 18. The direction of Twombly and Iqbal1’s quality-filtering effects is hardly alone on the list 
of important empirical questions that feasible data and methods are unlikely to resolve. 
See, for example, the debate over the existence of a deterrent effect of the death 
penalty, as investigated in John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of 
Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 794 (2005):  
Our estimates suggest not just “reasonable doubt” about whether there is any deterrent effect 
of the death penalty, but profound uncertainty. We are confident that the effects are not large, 
but we remain unsure even of whether they are positive or negative. The difficulty is not just 
one of statistical significance: whether one measures positive or negative effects of the death 
penalty is extremely sensitive to very small changes in econometric specifications. Moreover, 
we are pessimistic that existing data can resolve this uncertainty. 
 19. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). To be precise, Conley thereby set the 
pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which then has 
implications for Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Similarly, the Twiqbal cases change the           
Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard, thereby affecting Rule 12(b)(6) motion practice.  
 20. For discussions of such cases, see Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 
45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987 (2003); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading 
Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749 (1998); and Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986). 
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such reversal occurred in 1993 in a constitutional civil rights case,21 while 
another occurred as recently as 2002 in a Title VII employment discrimination 
case.22  
In 2007’s now-famous Twombly decision—regarding a putative class action 
involving allegations of conspiracy founded only on allegations of parallel 
conduct23—the Court switched direction. Although some of the arguments in 
Twombly could be read as applying specifically to antitrust’s substantive 
prohibition on drawing inferences of conspiracy from evidence indicating 
only the presence of parallel conduct, the Court was categorical in rejecting 
Conley’s no-set-of-facts standard, holding that it had “earned its retirement.”24 
Two years later, the Iqbal Court eliminated any residual doubt concerning the 
reach of Twombly’s new standard, straightforwardly holding that Twombly’s 
plausibility standard governed pleading in “all civil actions.”25 Twombly and 
Iqbal have been cited an enormous number of times: as of February 2016, 
Westlaw reported that Twombly had been cited in federal cases over 125,000 
times; for Iqbal, the corresponding figure was over 100,000 times. 
Twombly and Iqbal have also touched off a firestorm of debate among 
judges, practitioners, and academics.26 Critics believe that these cases have 
 
 21. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 
168 (1993) (“[I]t is impossible to square the ‘heightened pleading standard’ applied by the 
Fifth Circuit in this case with the liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the 
Federal Rules [and elaborated by the Court in Conley].”).  
 22. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (“[I]mposing the Court of Appeals’ 
heightened pleading standard in employment discrimination cases conflicts with 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which provides that a complaint must include 
only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.’ Such a statement must simply ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the 
plaintiff1’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” (first quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 
8(a)(2); then quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47)).  
 23. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550-51 (2007). 
 24. Id. at 563. 
 25. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
 26. See, e.g., Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Will 
Affect Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 
(2011) (statement of Andrew Pincus, Partner, Mayer Brown LLP), http://www 
.judiciary.senate.gov/download/testimony-of-pincuspdf (“Two years ago, many 
asserted that the Court’s ruling in Ashcroft v. Iqbal . . . would dramatically restrict 
plaintiffs’ access to court and that Congressional action was needed to overturn         
that decision. That speculation has been proven wrong . . . .” (citing FJC FIRST STUDY, 
supra note 7, at vii)); Mark Herrmann & James M. Beck, Debate, Plausible Denial:     
Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141,      
142 (2009), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/158-U-Pa-L-Rev-PENNumbra 
-141.pdf; Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the 
Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 852-53 
(2008) (“[N]o one quite understands what the case holds. . . . We district court judges 
suddenly and unexpectedly find ourselves puzzled over something we thought we 
knew how to do with our eyes closed: dispose of a motion to dismiss a case for failure to 
footnote continued on next page 
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destabilized the pleading system, and thus federal litigation generally.27 
Especially relevant to this Article, critics have argued that the plausibility 
pleading standard will reduce access to justice for plaintiffs with meritorious 
claims, especially in disputes whose alleged wrongdoers control access to the 
information necessary to meet the heightened pleading standard.28 By contrast, 
supporters of Twombly and Iqbal point to their hoped-for role in reducing the 
burdens presented by meritless lawsuits.29  
The Court’s opinions in the two cases themselves raise policy concerns 
related to the discovery burdens that defendants face. In Twombly, Justice 
Souter suggested that caution related to prediscovery dismissal must be 
counterbalanced against the expense of discovery in antitrust cases. He cited a 
law review student note that focused on the special discovery burdens antitrust 
 
state a claim.”); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 9-10 (2010). 
 27. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 852 (2010) (“Iqbal applies a thick 
screening model that aims to screen weak as well as meritless suits, whereas Twombly 
applies a thin screening model that aims to screen only truly meritless suits. The thick 
screening model is highly problematic on policy grounds[] . . . .”); Kevin M. Clermont & 
Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 840 & n.70 
(2010) (writing that a defense attorney “commits legal malpractice if he or she fails to 
move to dismiss with liberal citations to Twombly and Iqbal1” and quoting “experienced 
litigator” Tom Goldstein as “predict[ing] that Iqbal will be ‘the basis for an attempt to 
dismiss more than 50 percent of all the complaints filed in federal court’” (quoting 
Melinda Hanson, Civil Cases: Iqbal, Ricci, Wyeth, NAMUDNO Tagged as Landmark 
Opinions of the Term, 78 U.S. L. WEEK 3025, 3026 (2009))); Michael C. Dorf, Iqbal and Bad 
Apples, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 217, 218 (2010) (“Iqbal called into question an entire 
basis for civil liability for unconstitutional discrimination.”). 
 28. See, e.g., JOSHUA CIVIN & DEBO P. ADEGBILE, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, RESTORING  
ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF IQBAL AND TWOMBLY ON FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS 
LITIGATION 2 (2010), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Civin_Adegbile_Iqbal 
_Twombly.pdf (expressing fear that Twombly and Iqbal might “create an undesirable 
safe harbor that effectively places some defendants beyond the reach of civil rights 
laws”); Arthur R. Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing?: What’s Happened to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 587, 596 (2011) (“In many modern 
litigation contexts the critical information is in the possession of the defendant and 
unavailable to the plaintiff. . . . Discovery was designed to let each side have access to 
that type of information so that the litigation playing field would be level to promote 
more informed settlements and trials.”); Reinert, supra note 8, at 159 (“[C]ases in which 
state of mind plays a large role or in which there are large information asymmetries, 
such as civil rights, constitutional, and employment discrimination cases, are most 
likely to be vulnerable to accusations of thin pleading.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Of Pleading and Discovery: Reflections on Twombly and Iqbal 
with Special Reference to Antitrust, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 187, 196 (“[A] bad set of legal rules 
also leads to bad settlements. As a general matter, these settlements reflect the probable 
outcomes of cases that go to final judgment. Any errors in the overall procedural rules, 
therefore, are likely to be embedded in the settlements.”); Herrmann & Beck, supra 
note 26, at 146-47. 
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defendants face,30 the Manual for Complex Litigation,31 and a Judicial 
Conference Committee document emphasizing discovery’s high share of 
litigation costs in cases where it is used.32 Moreover, in responding to Justice 
Stevens’s suggestion in dissent that judicial management of cases could address 
these issues, Justice Souter declared defeat in the use of case management “given 
the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking 
discovery abuse has been on the modest side.”33  
Justice Souter’s concern regarding the role of discovery expense is well 
summarized by the following passage: 
[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle 
even anemic cases before reaching [summary judgment]. Probably, then, it is only 
by taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that 
we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with 
no “reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant 
evidence” to support [an antitrust claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act].34 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal involved a defendant facing a different kind of discovery 
burden. The plaintiff alleged that after the attacks of September 11, 2001, he 
was arrested and held in administrative detention where he had suffered 
“brutal mistreatment and discrimination,”35 including having been:  
 
 30. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (citing William H. Wagener, Note, 
Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting on Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust 
Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1887, 1898-99 (2003)). 
 31. Id. at 558-59 (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 30 (2004)). 
 32. Id. at 559 (citing Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on 
Civil Rules, to Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of 
the Judicial Conference of the U.S. (May 11, 1999), 192 F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000)). 
 33. Id. For this proposition, Justice Souter cited a law review article by Judge Frank 
Easterbrook, see id., whose argument may be worth quoting at length:  
The timing is all wrong. The plaintiff files a sketchy complaint (the Rules of Civil Procedure 
discourage fulsome documents), and discovery is launched. A judicial officer does not know 
the details of the case the parties will present and in theory cannot know the details. Discovery 
is used to find the details. The judicial officer always knows less than the parties, and the 
parties themselves may not know very well where they are going or what they expect to find. 
A magistrate supervising discovery does not—cannot—know the expected productivity of a 
given request, because the nature of the requester’s claim and the contents of the files (or head) 
of the adverse party are unknown. Judicial officers cannot measure the costs and benefits to 
the requester and so cannot isolate impositional requests. Requesters have no reason to 
disclose their own estimates because they gain from imposing costs on rivals (and may lose 
from an improvement in accuracy). The portions of the Rules of Civil Procedure calling on 
judges to trim back excessive demands, therefore, have been, and are doomed to be, hollow. 
  Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638 (1989). 
 34. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)). 
 35. First Amended Complaint & Jury Demand at 1, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 1:04-cv-
01809 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), aff1’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 
143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), 2004 WL 3756442. 
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deliberately and cruelly subjected to numerous instances of excessive force and 
verbal abuse, unlawful strip and body cavity-searches, denial of medical 
treatment, the denial of adequate nutrition, extended detention in solitary 
confinement, the denial of adequate exercise, and deliberate interference with . . . 
rights to counsel and to exercise of . . . sincere religious beliefs.36  
In addition to low-ranking defendants such as correctional officers, Iqbal sued 
then-Attorney General John Ashcroft and then-FBI Director Robert Mueller, 
alleging that the government had treated him unlawfully “as a matter of policy, 
solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no 
legitimate penological interest.”37 
Echoing Justice Souter’s skepticism of managerial judging as a solution to 
discovery costs, Justice Kennedy wrote that the “rejection of the careful-case-
management approach is especially important in suits where Government-
official defendants are entitled to . . . [be free of] the concerns of litigation, 
including ‘avoidance of disruptive discovery.’”38 Justice Kennedy also linked 
the Court’s earlier holding in Twombly explicitly to discovery, writing that 
although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s pleading standard in Rule 8 
“marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical . . . regime of 
a prior era, . . . it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed 
with nothing more than conclusions,” rather than hard factual information 
provided in the lawsuit’s complaint.39  
In sum, the majority opinions in both Twombly and Iqbal focus on the 
discovery burdens defendants can be expected to face in a system that allows 
merits determinations only after discovery. Each opinion suggests a belief that 
district courts will be able to usefully forecast, on the basis of the plaintiffs’ 
complaints, the set of cases in which discovery will yield evidence of liability, 
signaling the useful link between summary judgment results and the case-
quality views held by supporters and opponents of Twombly and Iqbal.  
B. Defining “Merit” Postdiscovery 
Under Rule 56, summary judgment should be granted only when “there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”40 Thus, summary judgment against a plaintiff1’s 
claim is appropriate only when the plaintiff has been able to come up with no 
 
 36. Id. at 3. 
 37. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 669 (alteration in original) (quoting First Amended Complaint & Jury 
Demand, supra note 35, at 17-18). 
 38. Id. at 685 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment)). 
 39. Id. at 678-79. 
 40. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
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evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find in her favor.41 One might 
say that where pleading standards involve judgments about the possibility 
(Conley) or plausibility (Twiqbal) that sufficient facts will materialize to entitle 
the plaintiff to relief, the summary judgment standard involves the actuality of 
entitlement to relief given those facts that have been discovered. 
This Article defines a claim as having no merit postdiscovery—or just “no 
merit”—if summary judgment for the defendant is appropriate. Conversely, 
this Article assumes a claim “has merit postdiscovery” if, after discovery, the 
plaintiff would be able to survive a summary judgment motion. These 
definitions are not intended to, and do not, implicate a claim’s prediscovery 
merit. Importantly, there is no reason why a case that turns out to be meritless 
postdiscovery might not have merit prediscovery. To take an extreme example, 
suppose Paula has actually been injured due to someone’s negligence. After a 
reasonable investigation, she sues DeAndre, who appears to be responsible, 
only to find out through discovery that Dave was actually responsible.42 By my 
definition, Paula’s claim against DeAndre has no merit postdiscovery, even 
though many, if not all, would agree that it was meritorious prediscovery.  
Of course, such a case is not the sort that Twombly and Iqbal purport to 
target; by their own terms, Twombly and Iqbal would not lead to Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal of Paula’s case since her complaint meets the plausibility standard. 
Nevertheless, my definition of merit postdiscovery is a good one for 
understanding Twombly and Iqbal1’s effects on case quality. Even though it is 
true that Twombly and Iqbal are directed at early termination of cases based on a 
judge’s prediscovery assessment, the object of that assessment is whether, after 
discovery, there is likely to be any evidence of entitlement to relief. This object 
is precisely what the definition of postdiscovery merit is meant to encapsulate. 
C. Understanding the Summary Judgment Link when Only Judges’ 
Behavior Changes Following Twombly and Iqbal 
This Subpart begins to explain the empirical link between pleading 
standards and summary judgment, as well as how the arguments for and 
against higher pleading standards relate to this link. Because the possibility that 
parties might change their litigation behavior following a change in the 
pleading standard makes this analysis a bit complicated, it is helpful to start by 
 
 41. Note that “no evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find in her favor” is not 
the same thing as no evidence at all. It is not sufficient for a plaintiff to come up with a 
mere “scintilla” of evidence, because courts impose a burden of production on parties 
that requires some minimal level of evidence that is more than simply a shred. See 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (“The mere existence of a 
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff1’s position will be insufficient; there 
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Zielinski v. Phila. Piers, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 408, 410-11 (E.D. Pa. 1956). 
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imagining that party behavior is unaffected by Twiqbal. The issue of changes in 
party behavior is subsequently taken up and addressed in Subpart D below. 
In a suit with no merit postdiscovery, there will by definition be no 
genuine dispute concerning any material fact after discovery, and the 
defendant will be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, 
defendants should always win their summary judgment motions in meritless 
suits. In his opinion for the Twombly Court, Justice Souter wrote that the 
plausibility standard “calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation 
that discovery will reveal evidence of [entitlement to relief].”43 Thus, one 
useful way to understand the plausibility standard is that it (i) asks trial judges 
to forecast what will result from discovery, and (ii) expects them to be able to 
forecast that result with some level of success. Translated into empirical terms, 
one may read Justice Souter’s opinion to mean that the plausibility standard 
“calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that the case will have 
merit postdiscovery.” This reading of Justice Souter’s opinion in Twombly allows 
us usefully to connect the plausibility pleading standard to summary judgment 
adjudication.  
Accordingly, under the “supporters’ view,” judges are presumed to be good 
at forming expectations regarding the expected fruits of discovery. Consider a 
judge adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. If the supporters’ view is 
right, then the judge will be at least partly able to forecast whether the case will 
have no merit postdiscovery. Thus, under the Twiqbal pleading standard, judges 
will be more likely to dismiss cases that would turn out to have no merit 
postdiscovery. Elsewhere I have called such changes in what judges do “judicial 
behavior effects.”44 
However, the supporters’ view is not the only possible way of looking at 
the link between pleading and postdiscovery merit. As discussed above, Twiqbal 
critics worry that judges will erroneously dismiss at least some high-merit 
cases under the plausibility pleading standard because plaintiffs will be unable 
to allege sufficient information at the pleading stage. That is, these critics fear 
that some cases that would actually turn out to have merit postdiscovery will 
be dismissed at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage because judges wrongly forecast that 
discovery will indicate that such cases lack merit.  
Among these Twiqbal critics, one might imagine two polar strains of 
critical views. Under what may be termed an “aggressive critics’ view,” judges 
will do such an inaccurate job of forecasting discovery results that they will be 
systematically more likely to dismiss high-merit cases than to dismiss low-
 
 43. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The Court actually said “calls for 
enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of 
illegal agreement,” in reference to Twombly’s section 1 antitrust context. Id. 
 44. See, e.g., Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery?, supra note 10, at 2276 (italics omitted). 
Material Facts in the Debate over Twombly and Iqbal 
68 STAN. L. REV. 369 (2016) 
384 
merit cases.45 Under an alternative “moderate critics’ view,” judges might be 
neither particularly good nor particularly bad at forecasting discovery 
results.46 Accordingly, the moderate critics’ view holds that Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissals will be essentially random with respect to postdiscovery case quality: 
the probability of dismissing high- and zero-merit cases will track their 
relative incidence in the population of cases facing Rule 12(b)(6) motions.47 
 
 45. Such a view might be held by one who believes that at least some judges are 
unwarrantedly skeptical of plaintiffs in certain classes of cases, such as those involving 
allegations of employment discrimination. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The 
Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 530 (2010) (endorsing 
observation by Stephen Burbank that Iqbal “obviously licenses highly subjective 
judgments” and that such a license constitutes “a blank check for federal judges to get 
rid of cases they disfavor” (quoting Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could Lead to a Broad 
Shift on Civil Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, at A10)). 
 46. For an expression that is consistent with the moderate critics’ view, see Reinert, supra 
note 8, at 161, stating that “there is no reason to think that courts will be skillful in 
determining which potentially dismissible case is most likely to be shown to be 
meritorious.” 
 47. Notice that I have assumed that the applicable pleading standard has no bearing on 
whether a given plaintiff would win at summary judgment, once a case actually gets 
there. This assumption can be justified from two more primitive assumptions. The first 
primitive assumption is that the pleading standard does not affect the record that will 
exist once the parties get through discovery and to summary judgment, if indeed a case 
survives to discovery. The second primitive assumption is that, for a given record, 
judges will adjudicate summary judgment motions the same way post-Iqbal as pre-
Twombly. If both these assumptions hold, then a given case that makes it to summary 
judgment under both pleading standards will have the same record, which will be 
adjudicated the same way, under both pleading standards.  
  One might challenge the first assumption on the ground that Twombly and Iqbal give 
plaintiffs an incentive to conduct a more comprehensive investigation before filing 
suit in order to draft a complaint that is more likely to be found plausible in the event 
that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is filed. Would more intensive prefiling investigations lead 
to a more plaintiff-friendly record post-Iqbal than pre-Twombly? Not necessarily, 
because it is possible—indeed, arguably likely—that evidence relevant to the summary 
judgment record that a plaintiff could uncover in a pre-filing investigation under the 
post-Iqbal pleading standard would also turn up during discovery under the pre-Twombly 
pleading standard.  
  Since the summary judgment standard was unaffected by Twiqbal, the second 
assumption is really quite undemanding. Still, one might imagine arguments to the 
contrary. For example, numerous scholars argue that Twombly and Iqbal are part of a 
broad campaign of retrenchment against plaintiffs. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Sean 
Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1614 (2014); 
Eisenberg & Clermont, supra note 7, at 193; Schneider, supra note 45, at 520. If judges 
respond to such a campaign by “tightening up” on plaintiffs across the board, then the 
second primitive assumption would fail to hold. It is worth noting that if such 
“zeitgeist” effects do occur, then it is highly unlikely that there will exist any empirical 
strategy that allows us to learn about the quality-filtering effects of Twiqbal. Some 
behavioral assumptions are inevitably necessary to allow one to estimate the effects of 
legal rules. See Gelbach, Dark Arts, supra note 10, at 245. 
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Table 1 summarizes the analysis so far. The first row of the Table 
illustrates the Twiqbal supporters’ view that cases that would turn out to have 
no merit postdiscovery will be eliminated by switching to the plausibility 
pleading standard. As a result, (i) there will be fewer cases facing summary 
judgment motions, and (ii) among those cases that do face such motions, an 
increased share will have merit postdiscovery. Consequently, under the 
supporters’ view, the plaintiff1’s win rate on summary judgment motions raised 
by the defendant should be greater among cases filed under the Twiqbal 
pleading standard.  
 
Table 1 
Predictions Flowing from Supporters’ and Critics’ Views 
when There Is No Selection into Summary Judgment 
 
Table 1’s second row indicates the aggressive critics’ view—that switching 
to a plausibility pleading standard will result in the elimination of meritorious 
cases. Under this view, (i) there will be fewer cases facing summary judgment 
motions, and (ii) among those cases that do face such motions, a reduced share 
will have merit postdiscovery. Consequently, under the aggressive critics’ 
view, the plaintiffs’ win rate against defense summary judgment motions 
should be lower among cases filed under the Twiqbal pleading standard. The 
third row indicates the moderate critics’ view—that cases will be randomly 
filtered out as a result of Twombly and Iqbal, leading to no change in the quality 
of cases that actually face defense summary judgment motions. As a result,       
(i) there will be fewer cases facing summary judgment motions, and (ii) among 
those cases that do face such motions, there will be no change in the share that 
would have merit postdiscovery. Consequently, under the moderate critics’ 
view, the plaintiff1’s win rate against defense summary judgment motions 
should be unaffected by switching to the Twiqbal pleading standard.  
Of course, the three views detailed here—supporters’, aggressive critics’, 
and moderate critics’—are ideal types. The reality is presumably somewhere in 
 Impact on:
 (1) (2) (3) 
View 
Number of 
Cases Facing 
Summary 
Judgment 
Motions
Share of Cases that Have 
Merit Postdiscovery 
Among Those Facing 
Defense Summary 
Judgment Motions
Plaintiff ’s Win 
Rate Against 
Summary 
Judgment 
Motions 
Supporters Drops Increases Increases 
Aggressive 
Critics 
Drops Drops Drops 
Moderate 
Critics 
Drops Stays Unchanged Stays Unchanged 
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the middle. For example, judges’ use of Twiqbal to do quality filtering might 
lead to some erroneous dismissals of meritorious cases, which is in line with 
both types of critics’ views, even as they dismiss proportionally more cases that 
have no merit, which is in line with the supporters’ view. One way of thinking 
about the empirical approach used in this Article, then, is that it has the 
potential to identify not so much which of the three views in Table 1 is 
entirely correct, but which is more correct. 
Table 1 allows us to connect an observable fact and a key question of 
interest in understanding Twiqbal1’s effects. The observable fact is the direction 
in which the plaintiff1’s win rate against defense summary judgment motions 
changes. The question of interest is whether Twiqbal has led district court 
judges to systematically filter out cases that would have no merit 
postdiscovery, as the supporters’ view predicts, or whether one of the critics’ 
views holds instead. 
In fact, under our maintained assumption of no change in party behavior, 
empirical evidence would enable even further illumination of the issue. As we 
have discussed, Twiqbal1’s more demanding pleading standard forces judges to 
filter out some cases at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. But Twiqbal certainly should not 
cause judges to deny any Rule 12(b)(6) motions they would otherwise grant. 
Accordingly, while Twiqbal should cause some cases to be filtered out of the set 
of cases that would face summary judgment motions if allowed to get to 
discovery, Twiqbal should not cause any cases to select into summary judgment 
absent party selection effects: there should not be any cases that would face 
summary judgment under the Twiqbal pleading standard but not under the pre-
Twiqbal standard. This means that any difference in the pre-Twombly/post-Iqbal 
plaintiff1’s win rate against defense summary judgment motions would have to 
be driven by case-quality differences between filtered-out cases, on the one 
hand, and those that face summary judgment motions under both pleading 
standards, on the other.  
Consider a simple, concrete example. Suppose that 900 cases would face 
summary judgment motions if litigated at a time when the pre-Twombly 
pleading standard applied. Now suppose that only 600 of these cases would face 
summary judgment motions if litigated at a time when the Twiqbal standard 
applied. This means that there are 300 cases that would be filtered out of the 
system before facing summary judgment motions as a result of Twiqbal. Now 
suppose that the plaintiff1’s win rate against defense summary judgment 
motions in these cases is 35% if the cases are litigated at a time when the pre-
Twombly pleading standard applied, and 40% if litigated under Twiqbal. The 
impact of Twiqbal on the overall plaintiff1’s win rate at summary judgment 
would thus be 5 percentage points (40% minus 35%). However, by construction, 
there are 600 cases whose summary judgment outcome remains unaffected by 
Twiqbal. Thus, the impact of 5 percentage points is driven by the 300 cases that 
are filtered out of summary judgment due to Twiqbal. These 300 cases 
constitute one-third of the original 900 cases. Intuition suggests that if filtering 
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out one-third of cases cause a 5-point increase in the plaintiff1’s win rate, then 
the plaintiff1’s win rate among the filtered-out cases must be less than the 
plaintiff1’s win rate among other cases by 15 percentage points (3 times 5 
percentage points). 
Thus, we should surmise that the plaintiff1’s win rate among the 300 
filtered-out cases is 15 percentage points less than plaintiff1’s win rate in the 
cases whose summary judgment status is unaffected by Twiqbal (in this example 
the supporters’ view is correct). The same reasoning suggests that if the 
filtered-out cases constituted one-fourth of the total, then we should multiply 
the observed difference in the plaintiff1’s win rate by four; were they half of the 
total number of cases, then we should multiply by two; and so on. This 
intuition is exactly right. It can be proved mathematically that when there is 
no selection into summary judgment, the difference between the plaintiff1’s 
win rate among filtered-out cases and those that would have summary 
judgment motions under both pleading standards equals the ratio of (i) the 
change in the plaintiff1’s win rate against defense summary judgment motions, 
to (ii) the share of cases that are filtered out from facing summary judgment as 
a result of Twiqbal.48 
 
 48. Let  be the plaintiff1’s win rate among cases that would face summary judgment 
motions under both pleading standards, and let  be the corresponding plaintiff1’s 
win rate among cases that would be filtered out of facing summary judgment motions 
due to Twombly and Iqbal. Define the quality-filtering effect ; this is the 
effect we wish to identify. I shall now prove that  may be determined from observable 
data under the assumption of no selection into summary judgment. 
  Let  and  be the observed plaintiff1’s win rate against defense summary 
judgment motions under the pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal pleading standards, 
respectively. Let  be the plaintiff1’s win rate against defense summary judgment 
motions among cases that would face summary judgment motions under both pleading 
standards, and let  be the corresponding plaintiff1’s win rate among any cases that 
select into summary judgment. Lastly, denote by  the share of pre-Twombly cases with 
summary judgment motions that would be filtered out by Twiqbal, and denote by  the 
share of post-Iqbal cases with summary judgment motions that select into summary 
judgment (note that 0 under the assumption of no party selection effects, which I 
have maintained in the discussion in this section, but it is useful to allow it to be 
nonzero for expositional purposes in this footnote). Then we may write the observed 
plaintiff1’s win rate as: 
 1
1
  (1) 
  It follows that the change in the observed plaintiff1’s win rate is: 
 
	
 (2) 
  where the second line follows by adding and subtracting  to the right hand side of 
the first line. If we then adopt the assumption of no selection into summary judgment, 
so that λ is zero, the term in curly braces disappears, and we obtain: 
 (3) 
  Now observe that if we divide both sides of equation (3) by  and rearrange slightly, we 
get:  
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To recap the discussion in this Part, this Article has adopted two 
assumptions and derived three key analytical results:  
 Assumption 1: There is no change in party behavior as a result of 
Twiqbal. 
 Assumption 2: How cases are adjudicated at summary judgment is 
not affected by the pleading standard that governs through the 
Rule 12(b)(6) stage.49 
 
 		  (4) 
  In other words, the quality-filtering effect, , equals the ratio of the observed 
change in the plaintiff1’s win rate against defense summary judgment motions divided 
by the filtered-out share π. To make this equation useful requires us to have a way to 
determine  using observable data.  
  Let  and  be the number of cases that would face summary judgment 
motions under the pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal pleading standards, respectively. Let 
, , and  respectively be the number of cases that would face summary 
judgment motions under both pleading standards, the number that would be filtered 
out due to Twiqbal, and the number that would select into summary judgment due to 
Twiqbal. Then it is always true that: 
  (5) 
  Subtracting each side of the bottom equation in (5) from the corresponding side of the 
top equation then yields: 
 (6) 
  so that the observed change in the number of cases facing summary judgment motions 
equals the difference in the number of cases that select into summary judgment and the 
number that are filtered out. Under the assumption of no selection into summary 
judgment, we have 0; adopting this assumption and dividing both sides of (6) by 
 then yields: 
  (7) 
  and since the ratio on the right hand side of (7) is the filtered-out share, we have: 
   (8) 
  In other words, π may be calculated from observable data: it equals negative-1 times the 
change in the number of cases that face summary judgment motions, expressed as a 
ratio of the number of cases that would face summary judgment motions under the 
pre-Twombly pleading standard. Combining equations (4) and (8) thus yields:  
 			 				 			 					  (9) 
  All terms on the right hand side of equation (9) are observable quantities. This proves 
that under the assumption of no selection into summary judgment, the quality-
filtering effect of Twiqbal, , may be found using observable data.  
 49. For a discussion of this assumption, see note 47 above. 
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 Result 1: The number of cases that face summary judgment 
motions will be lower under Twiqbal than under the pre-Twiqbal 
pleading standard. 
 Result 2: If the supporters are correct, the plaintiff1’s win rate 
against defense summary judgment motions will be greater under 
Twiqbal than under the pre-Twiqbal pleading standard; if the 
aggressive critics are correct, this rate will be lower under 
Twiqbal; and if the moderate critics are correct, the plaintiff1’s win 
rate will be unaffected by the switch to Twiqbal. 
 Result 3: The difference between the plaintiff1’s win rate among 
cases that are filtered out of facing summary judgment motions 
and those that would face these motions regardless of the 
pleading standard equals (i) the observed difference in the 
plaintiff1’s win rate across pleading standards, divided by (ii) the 
percentage drop in the number of cases facing summary 
judgment motions. 
Subpart D below turns to the important question of how party selection 
effects affect the analysis described herein. 
D. Party Selection Effects of Twombly and Iqbal  
The discussion above in Subpart C assumed that Twombly and Iqbal1’s 
filtering effect operates only via changes in judicial behavior among cases that 
face a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. But Twombly and Iqbal can be expected to have 
broader effects, via changes in party behavior that can be thought of as “party 
selection effects.”50 Three of these types of party selection effects involve 
filtering out cases at the pre-Rule 12(b)(6) stage; these are discussed in             
Part IV.D.1. The fourth type involves the selection of cases into summary 
judgment; this type is discussed in Part IV.D.2. 
1. Party selection effects that involve filtering out at the 
Rule 12(b)(6) stage 
To illustrate party selection effects, consider a hypothetical dispute in 
which Smith believes that Jones, Inc. has discriminated against her. Assume for 
the moment that under the pre-Twombly pleading standard, Jones will forego 
filing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and the case would go through discovery and then 
face a summary judgment motion. However, under the post-Iqbal pleading 
standard, Jones might become sufficiently optimistic about prevailing on    
Rule 12(b)(6) that Jones would file such a motion if Smith filed a complaint, and 
knowing this, and being pessimistic about her chances of surviving a            
Rule 12(b)(6) motion under Twiqbal, Smith might choose not to file suit in the 
 
 50. See, e.g., Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery?, supra note 10, at 2280. 
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first place. This is an example of what I have elsewhere referred to as “plaintiff 
selection.”51 In this example, a dispute that would make it to summary 
judgment under the pre-Twombly pleading standard would not get there post-
Iqbal. 
Consider a variation on the previous example’s theme. The pre-Twombly 
situation is the same as in the previous example. But under the post-Iqbal 
standard, Smith is more optimistic about her Rule 12(b)(6) chances, and so she 
files suit even after Twiqbal. If Jones files a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and prevails on 
it, then once again we have a dispute that would make it to summary judgment 
under the pre-Twombly pleading standard but that would not get there post-
Iqbal. This is an example of what I have elsewhere referred to as “defendant 
selection.”52 
For a second variation on the original example, suppose both parties 
expect that under the post-Iqbal standard the judge would be very likely to 
grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Then under that pleading standard, the parties 
might be able to find a mutually agreeable settlement amount before the      
Rule 12(b)(6) stage. In this example, too, then, we have a dispute that would 
make it to summary judgment pre-Twombly but that would not get there post-
Iqbal; this is an example of what I have elsewhere referred to as “settlement 
selection.”53  
These three examples involve three different types of party selection, but 
in each case, Twiqbal1’s selection effects cause a reduction in the number of cases 
that make it to summary judgment. Thus, these types of party selection operate 
in tandem with the judicial behavior effects discussed above in Part I.C,54 to 
filter cases out of the set that face summary judgment motions. 
Accordingly, the analysis above applies to these types of party selection as 
well as to judicial behavior effects. However, it is important to observe that 
when there are party selection effects, Twiqbal1’s quality-filtering effect must be 
interpreted more carefully. This effect can no longer be viewed as indicating 
only whether judges are good at forecasting postdiscovery case merit. With 
party selection effects of the types discussed above, Twiqbal1’s quality-filtering 
effects operate through both judicial filtering and party filtering. Because there 
is no evident way to determine which filtered-out cases are filtered out due to 
 
 51. Id. at 2276 (italics omitted). 
 52. Id. (italics omitted). Such a dispute is one in which the plaintiff files suit under either 
pleading standard, with the defendant allowing the case to go to discovery under the 
pre-Twiqbal standard but filing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion under the post-Twiqbal standard. 
See id. 
 53. See id. at 2277. For a recent empirical study concerning settlement rates before Twombly 
and after Iqbal, see Victor Abel Pereyra & Benjamin Sunshine, Access-to-Justice v. 
Efficiency: An Empirical Study of Settlement Rates After Twombly & Iqbal, 2015 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 357. 
 54. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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changes in judicial behavior at Rule 12(b)(6) and which are filtered out due to 
party selection, all we can hope to measure is the overall net change resulting 
from the combined effects of both variables.  
Table 1 remains germane, but the channels through which Twiqbal 
operates are broader: they encompass changes in both judicial and party 
behavior.55 
2. A party selection effect that involves selection into summary 
judgment  
There remains one type of party selection effect to discuss. Consider again 
our hypothetical dispute between Smith and Jones. But now assume that under 
the notice pleading standard, Smith and Jones would settle the dispute before 
Smith files suit, in part because Jones would not expect to be able to win a 
prediscovery dismissal of a lawsuit, should Smith file suit. If the same dispute 
occurred when the post-Twiqbal pleading standard applied, though, Jones 
might believe it could win a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, making the company 
unwilling to settle for an amount Smith would accept. Now suppose that Jones, 
having been overly optimistic, lost its post-Twiqbal Rule 12(b)(6) motion. If the 
parties did not then settle, then under the post-Twiqbal pleading standard, Smith 
v. Jones, Inc. would reach the discovery phase and possibly also the summary 
judgment phase.56 
This example shows that changes in the pleading standard can eliminate 
settlements, causing cases to select into summary judgment. An immediate 
consequence of this fact is that it is possible for the number of cases that face 
summary judgment motions to rise as a result of Twombly and Iqbal. Whether 
that happens will depend on the relative magnitudes of filtering out by judges 
 
 55. Insofar as Twiqbal shifted the pre-Rule 12(b)(6) balance of power in favor of defendants, 
cases that are filtered out of summary judgment due to party selection can be expected 
to have done so on terms that are both beneficial to defendants and detrimental to 
plaintiffs. That places party-filtered cases and judge-filtered cases on a similar footing—
both involve Twombly and Iqbal working to cause cases to end before summary 
judgment in ways that benefit defendants at plaintiffs’ expense. 
 56. It is possible that the parties would settle following the denial of Jones’s Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion; after all, under the notice pleading standard, they would settle before Smith 
even filed suit. But it is also possible that the parties would not settle. One inducement 
to settle before either party files suit is that it allows the parties to avoid all costs not 
yet sunk into the filing and defending of the suit. Once the plaintiff files suit, she has 
sunk some costs, reducing the scope for a settlement to leave both parties better off. 
Similarly, by litigating its Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Jones might have made some 
investigations that also reduce its cost of post-Rule 12(b)(6) litigation; sinking such 
costs further reduces the scope for mutually beneficial settlement. Thus, some cases 
that would (i) settle without the filing of a complaint under the notice pleading 
standard but (ii) face a Rule 12(b)(6) motion under the plausibility pleading standard 
might not settle following denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 
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and parties, on the one hand, and selection into summary judgment due to 
failed settlements, on the other.  
One thing that can be said is that if a change from the pre-Twiqbal pleading 
standard to the post-Twiqbal pleading standard does cause an increase in the 
number of cases facing summary judgment motions, then there must have been 
selection into summary judgment.57 Beyond that, the analysis of what can be 
gleaned from the data when there is selection into summary judgment is 
relatively complicated. Differences in the plaintiff1’s win rate at summary 
judgment across cases filed under different pleading standard regimes then 
involve both (i) the quality-filtering effect discussed above, and (ii) the 
difference in case quality between cases that are filtered out and cases that select 
into summary judgment.58 In this situation, empirical evidence will not be able 
 
 57. Note that the converse is not true: even if the change in the pleading standard causes a 
decrease in the number of cases facing summary judgment motions, it is still possible 
that there is some selection into summary judgment; there might just be more filtering 
out than selection into summary judgment. 
 58. This fact may be seen using the second line of equation (2) from note 48 above, which 
shows that the difference in the post-Iqbal and pre-Twombly plaintiff1’s win rates may be 
written as: 
  
  The parameter  is the share, among cases that faces summary judgment motions under 
Twiqbal, of cases that would not have had summary judgment motions filed under the 
pre-Twiqbal pleading standard; in other words,  is the share of Twiqbal-standard cases 
that were selected into summary judgment. When  is zero—when there is no selection 
into summary judgment—this equation is necessarily proportional to the quality-
filtering effect  discussed above. But when there is selection into summary 
judgment,  is not zero, and the term  comes into play as well. This term is 
the difference in the plaintiff1’s win rate—the case-quality difference—between cases 
that select into summary judgment and those that are filtered out.  
  An example will help illustrate how important selection into summary judgment can 
be in determining what conclusions may be drawn from the observed difference in the 
plaintiff1’s win rate. Suppose that the number of cases with summary judgment motions 
filed under the two pleading standards would be exactly the same. This equality 
necessarily means that the number of filtered-out cases and the number of cases that 
are selected into summary judgment are the same; since there are the same total 
number of cases with summary judgment motions filed under the two pleading 
standards, this result in turn means that  and  must be equal. Consequently, what I 
have called the quality-filtering effect, , drops out of the equation above. 
What is left is the term . Since λ is a proportion, it is necessarily positive. 
Thus, when there is no change in the number of cases with summary judgment 
motions filed, so that , the observed difference in the plaintiff1’s win rate has       
the same sign as . In other words, the information in the observable data 
tells us whether cases that are selected into summary judgment or cases that are filtered 
out of summary judgment have greater quality, as measured by the plaintiff1’s win rate 
against defense summary judgment motions. In this example we would be unable to             
learn anything at all about quality among cases that would face summary judgment 
motions under both pleading standards. That would prevent us from determining 
whether either the filtering-out or selecting-in channels of Twiqbal improve quality. 
When		 —when there is no difference in the number of summary judgment 
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to resolve the debates over Twiqbal1’s case-quality effects that have occurred in 
recent years. 
II. Data 
The data used here originally became available as a result of a grant funded 
by the Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund at the Yale Law School.59 That grant funded 
a contract between Yale and Thomson Reuters, owner of Westlaw, to provide 
direct access to the universe of federal district court docket reports for civil 
cases filed beginning on January 1, 2005. These are the docket-sheet data one 
can search on Westlaw via its “DCT” database.60  
The sample used for this study was constructed by first searching the 
docket reports in all employment discrimination or contract cases for text 
suggesting that a docket entry involved the filing of a motion for summary 
judgment.61 Next, docket-sheet entries were collected from each selected case, 
and the cases were sorted by the number generated using a computerized 
pseudorandom number generator. Cases were then served in this random order 
to coders who logged on to a secure web-based coding site. The coder assigned 
to particular cases then read through those cases’ docket sheets, looking for 
entries that appeared to be motions for summary judgment and orders 
resolving them. These coders then downloaded the relevant documents—
motions and resolving orders—from a legal research site, read the documents, 
and entered details concerning the motions and their resolutions. 
Employment discrimination cases were chosen both because there are a 
large number of them and because many critics of Twombly and Iqbal have 
focused on employment discrimination suits as among those most prone to the 
information asymmetry that might create a need-discovery-to-get-to-
discovery catch-22.62 Contract cases, on the other hand, were chosen because 
 
motions faced by cases under the two pleading standards—the data simply cannot tell 
us anything about such questions. 
 59. Yale Law School’s William N. Eskridge and I jointly submitted this grant. 
 60. Pursuant to the contract, Thomson Reuters delivered docket report data in raw form. 
Various database and scripting tools were used to select cases with at least one docket 
entry whose text indicated that the docketed event was a motion for summary 
judgment under Rule 56. These cases were uploaded into a database connected to a web-
based coding tool. A number of current J.D. students and recently graduated students 
working with the project then read and coded judicial opinions and orders related to 
cases’ summary judgment motions (as well as, where needed, the underlying motions or 
other case documents). 
 61. Roughly speaking, docket entries were searched to determine whether they began with 
the phrase “motion for summary judgment” or certain variations thereon. 
 62. Cases involving employment discrimination are those with PACER nature-of-suit 
code 442. All cases were dropped for which coding indicated the presence of any claims, 
among those challenged by a defense summary judgment motion, that were potentially 
related to the Americans with Disability Act (ADA). See Americans with Disabilities Act 
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plaintiffs in these cases would seem to be less likely to require information that 
can only be acquired in discovery to satisfy Twombly and Iqbal1’s plausibility 
standard.63  
This study includes cases that were initially filed in either of two time 
periods: (i) October 1, 2005 to June 30, 2006 (the “Pre-Twombly observation 
period”), and (ii) October 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010 (the “Post-Iqbal observation 
period”). These time periods were chosen because they were the ones used by 
the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) to evaluate changes in Rule 12(b)(6) filing rates 
in its initial study of the effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Rule 12(b)(6) practice.64 
These time periods are appropriate because the pre-Twombly observation 
period ends well in advance of Twombly (the Supreme Court released its 
opinion on May 21, 2007), and the post-Iqbal observation period begins several 
months after Iqbal (the Supreme Court released its opinion on May 18, 2009).65 
 
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 
(2014)). This exclusion of cases is warranted because the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
expanded the set of people protected by the ADA. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(1), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(b)); see also Seiner, Pleading Disability, supra note 7, at 108 (noting that the 
amendments in question “explicitly seek to ‘reinstat[e] a broad scope of protection’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting ADA Amendments Act of 2008, § 2(b)(1))). This change 
could be expected to induce more ADA-related cases and claims all else equal, so that 
defense summary judgment adjudication might differ across pre-Twombly and post-
Iqbal cases involving the ADA for reasons unrelated to the conceptual issues discussed 
in Part I. There are reserved PACER codes for ADA cases (code 445 is for ADA 
employment claims, and 446 is for other ADA claims). However, some cases with ADA 
claims are coded under PACER’s nature-of-suit code 442, the omnibus employment 
discrimination code. These cases can be identified using the brief textual description of 
challenged claims that coders were asked to create. Claims were coded as ADA-related 
when this description contained any of the following strings: “isabil,” “isable,” or 
“ADA.” It is possible that not all ADA-related cases were flagged this way by coders, but 
as many have been excluded as could have been. 
 63. Cases involving contracts are those with PACER nature-of-suit codes between 110 and 
190. 
 64. See FJC FIRST STUDY, supra note 7, at 25. 
 65. It is possible that with many delays or repeated pleading amendments, a case in my pre-
Twombly sample could have been at risk of facing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion after Twombly 
was decided. To assess this possibility, the earliest date on which each case had a 
summary judgment motion filed was coded. Among the cases used in the final analysis 
pre-Twombly sample, 87% of employment discrimination and 84% of contract cases had 
a summary judgment motion filed before Twombly, so none of these cases could have 
faced a Rule 12(b)(6) motion after Twombly (since Rule 12(b)(6) motions must be filed 
earlier than summary judgment motions). Note also that any Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
converted to a summary judgment motion must be decided under Rule 56. Results 
calculated without the remaining 13% and 16% of cases were very similar to those 
reported below. Finally, since discovery takes time, it is perhaps reasonable to assume 
that a case would not face a summary judgment motion fewer than ninety days 
following the filing of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Among cases in the final analysis pre-
Twombly sample, 96% of employment discrimination and 94% of contract cases had 
their first summary judgment motion filed within ninety days following May 21, 2007. 
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Further, the FJC characterizes the period between January and June of 2006 as 
one “of stable motion practice,” and its report suggests that the period between 
January and June of 2010 is appropriate because it occurs after “each of the 
circuits had had a chance to publish at least one appellate court opinion 
interpreting Ashcroft v. Iqbal and offering guidance to the district courts.”66 
Thus the observation periods used here are reasonable. Given the data that 
were available at the time case coding was undertaken, the sample used 
included only cases with summary judgment motions adjudicated within 731 
days of case filing.67 Finally, like the FJC reports, this study uses only cases in 
which plaintiffs were represented by counsel.68  
 
Thus there seems little basis for concern about whether the cases in my pre-Twombly 
sample were actually affected by Twombly. 
 66. See FJC FIRST STUDY, supra note 7, at 36. 
 67. The latest date on which a case could have been filed and included in the analysis was 
June 30, 2010. At the time the coders began work, the database had up-to-date 
information on cases through June 30, 2012. Therefore, docket-report information was 
available for up to 731 days (2012 having been a leap year). For cases filed on dates 
earlier than June 30, 2010, there were more days of information, but such information 
was disregarded in order to allow the same period of observation for all cases 
considered. Consequently, the sample includes only cases with summary judgment 
motions adjudicated within 731 days of case filing. Without the 731-day limit, 
noncomparability problems could occur. To illustrate, consider two cases—one filed on 
June 30, 2006, and one filed on June 30, 2010. The docket reports’ text is up-to-date 
through June 30, 2012 for both cases. Therefore, there are 2192 days of docket 
information for the earlier case (four years having 365 days, plus two leap years having 
366 days), by comparison to the 731 days of docket information for the later-filed case. 
Suppose that in general there are two types of cases, simple and complex, and suppose 
that simple cases always have motions for summary judgment filed and adjudicated 
within 731 days of case filing, while complex cases have these motions filed and 
adjudicated between 731 and 2192 days of case filing. Then an unrestricted search of 
earlier cases’ docket reports would yield a data set that included both simple and 
complex cases, whereas such a search of later cases’ docket reports would yield a data 
set including only simple cases. If claims challenged by defense summary judgment 
motions have different average merit levels in simple and complex cases, then ignoring 
the different lengths of data availability would bias the results. To avoid this potential 
problem and maintain comparability of the pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal data sets, only 
cases whose summary judgment motions are adjudicated within 731 days of case filing 
are considered. 
 68. Here I simply follow the approach in FJC FIRST STUDY, supra note 7, at 6 n.10. Shortly 
after handing down Twombly, the Supreme Court in Erickson v. Pardus reaffirmed that 
“a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards 
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Estelle v. Gamble, in turn, cites directly to 
Conley’s no-set-of-facts language. See 429 U.S. at 106 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 
41, 45-46 (1957)). For this reason, some empirical studies concerning Twombly and Iqbal 
exclude pro se cases, see, e.g., FJC FIRST STUDY, supra note 7, at 6 n.10, though the 
approach Cecil and his coauthors took has been somewhat controversial, see Moore, 
supra note 7, at 607. There were many fewer pro se than counseled cases in my sample, 
and excluding them does not have important effects on my results. 
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There is one case-coverage difference between the FJC reports69 and the 
present study. The FJC reports contain data from only twenty-three district 
courts, which according to the FJC, account for roughly half the civil cases 
filed in the U.S. district courts in 2009.70 By comparison, the sample employed 
by the study presented herein draws from cases in a considerably larger 
number of districts: seventy-five of the seventy-eight districts that had adopted 
the electronic case filing (ECF) system before October 1, 2005.71 
 
 69. See FJC FIRST STUDY, supra note 7; FJC SECOND STUDY, supra note 7.  
 70. FJC FIRST STUDY, supra note 7, at 5. 
 71. The Article considers only cases filed after their district courts had adopted the ECF 
system because docket report information tends to be much sparser among cases from 
district courts that had not yet adopted the ECF system. The date on which a district 
court adopted ECF was determined by visiting the Individual Court Sites webpage at the 
PACER website, see Individual Court Sites, PACER, http://www.pacer.gov/psco/cgi         
-bin/links.pl (last visited Feb. 2, 2016), and clicking on the information icon (which 
looks like this: ) next to each district court’s name. The resulting webpage lists the 
date on which the court began using the ECF system in the field “ECF Go Live Date.” 
The courts that had not yet gone live as of October 1, 2005, were the District of Nevada, 
District of Montana, District of North Dakota, District of Hawaii, District of Alaska, 
Eastern District of Oklahoma, Western District of Texas, Southern District of 
California, District of Vermont, Southern District of Florida, District of New Mexico, 
District of Virgin Islands, Central District of California, Western District of 
Wisconsin, District of Northern Mariana Islands, and Western District of Tennessee. I 
use only the seventy-eight districts that had fully implemented the CM/ECF system in 
order to avoid any problems that might arise if the ECF system were adopted between 
my pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal periods; such problems could occur to the extent that 
coders are able to obtain case documents more for cases filed after adoption than before, 
in late-adopting districts.  
  For a study of summary judgment activity in fiscal year 2006 by Federal Judicial Center 
researchers that uses the same universe of courts, see Memorandum from Joe Cecil & 
George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Michael Baylson, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the         
E. Dist. of Pa., Estimate of Summary Judgment Activity Fiscal Year 2006 (1June 15, 
2007), https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/sujufy06.pdf. I will not discuss the 
voluminous literature on summary judgment practice more broadly; for contributions 
concerning summary judgment practice, see, for example, Stephen B. Burbank, 
Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem 
or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591 (2004); Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century 
of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
861 (2007); Jonah B. Gelbach, Rethinking Summary Judgment Empirics: The Life of the 
Parties, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1663 (2014); Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, 
Summary Judgment Rates over Time, Across Case Categories, and Across Districts: An 
Empirical Study of Three Large Federal Districts (Cornell Law Sch. Research Paper No. 08-
022, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1138373; Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George 
Cort, supra. 
  This Article’s sample contains no cases from the district courts for the Northern 
District of Illinois, the Northern Mariana Islands, or the Southern District of West 
Virginia. It became evident after coding had been completed that docket entries 
involving summary judgment motions follow a different textual structure in these 
districts from the structure typically used elsewhere. Consequently, the text search 
used to find summary judgment motion entries did not detect cases in these districts. 
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Finally, the study had to determine how best to measure the plaintiff1’s win 
rate. Plaintiffs can state multiple claims in a lawsuit, and defendants can 
challenge none, all, or some subset of the claims in both Rule 12(b)(6) motions 
to dismiss and Rule 56 motions for summary judgment. Further, parties can 
move for,72 or be granted,73 summary judgment as to only certain aspects of a 
claim. This discussion raises the question of how to measure the plaintiff1’s win 
rate in defense summary judgment motions. Should it be the fraction of cases in 
which the plaintiff defeats a defense summary judgment motion on all 
challenged claims? Or should it be the fraction of cases in which the plaintiff 
defeats a defense summary judgment motion on at least one challenged claim?74  
A plaintiff, the saying goes, is the master of her complaint, so the number 
of claims lodged in an action is subject to party choice. Along the same lines, 
defendants are masters of their summary judgment motions: they choose for 
themselves which claims to attack. Thus, there is no convincing reason to 
prefer using the plaintiff-wins-on-all-claims or the plaintiff-wins-on-any-
claim measure of the plaintiff1’s win rate. Accordingly, the empirical work 
presented herein reports the change in the plaintiff1’s win rate for both the 
fraction of cases in which the plaintiff defeats a defense summary judgment 
motion on all challenged claims and the fraction of cases in which the plaintiff 
defeats a defense summary judgment motion on at least one challenged claim. 
This approach allows readers to choose which approach they favor, if either; in 
 
 72. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim 
or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 73. Id. 56(g) (“If the court does not grant all the relief requested by the motion, it may enter 
an order stating any material fact—including an item of damages or other relief—that is 
not genuinely in dispute and treating the fact as established in the case.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 74. A third alternative would be to use the fraction of all challenged claims in which the 
plaintiff defeats a defense summary judgment motion. Experience shows that it can 
sometimes be difficult to determine exactly how many claims are challenged via a 
defense summary judgment motion. An important reason for this difficulty is that 
defense summary judgment motions sometimes state that they challenge “all claims,” or 
some other phrasing with similar meaning, when some claims have already been 
withdrawn by the plaintiff or otherwise dismissed. To determine exactly how many 
claims are challenged for each case thus could require reading multiple case documents 
(e.g., complaints). There was not enough time to ask coders to engage in such 
extraordinarily detailed work. Also, the judicial orders or opinions resolving motions 
for summary judgment could not always be retrieved, but the disposition of the 
summary judgment motion in question could sometimes still be coded because it was 
docketed. In sum, a percentage-of-all-claims-challenged measure might well be beset by 
unavoidable measurement error. Moreover, sometimes particular issues, rather than 
claims as such, are challenged, and it is not always clear how to map general fact issues 
into claims. For these reasons, I restrict my attention to the two measures discussed in 
the text—whether the plaintiff prevails at summary judgment as to either all claims or 
at least one claim that the defendant challenges. 
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practice, though, my substantive conclusions are the same using either 
approach. 
III. Employment Discrimination Cases 
This Part of the Article reports the study’s empirical findings for 
employment discrimination cases. Part III.A discusses the details of the 
employment discrimination sample, while Part III.B discusses the empirical 
results for cases in this sample. These results indicate that regardless of 
whether a plaintiff1’s win is defined as winning with respect to all or simply at 
least one challenged claim or issue, and regardless of whether one adjusts for 
certain potential confounding variables, the plaintiff1’s win rate did not change 
in a statistically significant way following Twiqbal. 
A. Basic Characteristics of the Employment Discrimination Sample 
Coders processed a total of 2511 employment discrimination cases. Of 
these, 185 were dropped because they were from districts that had not adopted 
the ECF system as of October 1, 2005.75 An additional 335 were dropped 
because at least one pro se plaintiff was involved in at least one motion for 
summary judgment.76 A further 138 were dropped because they appeared to 
involve ADA-related claims. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 expanded the 
set of people covered by the ADA, which introduces a risk of misattributing 
effects of this change in ADA law to changes in pleading standards. This study 
therefore dropped from its sample those cases with claims that could be 
identified as ADA related.77 This left a sample of 1853 employment 
discrimination cases with summary judgment motions in which all plaintiffs 
had counsel and none of their claims appeared to be ADA related. In 32 of these, 
there was no defendant’s summary judgment motion filed.78 This left a total 
sample of 1821 non-ADA employment discrimination cases in which there 
were no pro se plaintiffs and at least one defense summary judgment motion.79  
The first column of Table 2 reports the number of such cases in the sample 
by year of filing (Panel A) and according to whether the filing year was in the 
pre-Twombly or post-Iqbal period (Panel B). All told, the sample contained 1189 
employment discrimination cases coded in the pre-Twombly period that had 
defense summary judgment motions and no pro se plaintiffs; there were 632 
 
 75. See supra note 71.  
 76. See supra note 68. 
 77. For a discussion of the method for identifying cases with ADA-related claims, see 
note 62 above. 
 78. Summary judgment motions filed by defendants in their capacity as cross-claimants or 
counterclaimants were not treated as defense summary judgment motions. 
 79. Only 74 of these 1821 cases also had a plaintiff1’s summary judgment motion filed. 
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such cases in the post-Iqbal period. The second column of Table 2 reports the 
number of these cases that had at least one summary judgment motion 
adjudicated within 731 days of case filing. It is not an accident that there are a 
disproportionate number of cases included in the 2005 filing period. Law 
school student coders were ready to work before all years of data were loaded 
into the database. Thus, while database code necessary to load the other years’ 
cases was completed, the students worked on coding cases that were filed in 
2005. To avoid any unrepresentativeness in the results, this study uses weights 
that adjust for the difference in sample sizes. These weights appear in the final 
column of Table 2; each case from 2005 effectively gets just under twenty-
seven percent as much weight as cases filed in other years.80 
Within each year, just below sixty percent of cases had motions that had 
been adjudicated before the 731-day cutoff. All told, the pre-Twombly period 
had 700 employment discrimination cases with no pro se plaintiff and an 
adjudicated defense summary judgment motion, while the post-Iqbal period had 
368 such cases. These are the cases on which the study’s primary analysis is 
performed below.  
 
  
 
 80. The weight for cases filed in 2005 was constructed so that it equals: 
2
				 				
243
	2 457
				 				0.266 
  where  and  are the numbers of cases in the second column of Table 2 for 2006 
and 2005, respectively; the resulting value ensures that cases filed in 2005 receive one-
third of the weight accorded to cases in my pre-Twombly period, reflecting the relative 
number of days from 2005 in that period. Note that this is the opposite of the approach 
one would take in a stratified sampling design, wherein the weight a stratum receives is 
an increasing function of the fraction of sampling fractions that were used, since 
sample means within these strata have lower variance. In the usual case, one is trying 
to obtain lower-variance estimates in a sample for which the population mean is 
assumed not to vary across strata. Here, though, my concern is with the 
representativeness of the sample, and I am unwilling to assume that the 2005 and 2006 
population means of outcome variables necessarily are the same. 
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Table 2 
Number of Employment Discrimination Cases with Summary Judgment 
Motions Filed in Observed Period and with Adjudications Within 731 Days 
 Defense Summary Judgment Motion 
 
Filed in 
Observed  
Period 
Adjudicated 
Within  
731 Days 
Sampling 
Weight 
A. By Year Case Filed  
2005 (Oct. 1—Dec. 31) 769 457 0.266 
2006 (1Jan. 1—June 30) 420 243 1 
2009 (Oct. 1—Dec. 31) 206 119 1 
2010 (1Jan. 1—June 30) 426 249 1 
B. By Pre-Twombly/Post-Iqbal  
Total Pre-Twombly 1189 700  
Total Post-Iqbal 632 368  
B. Summary Judgment Adjudication Results for Employment 
Discrimination Cases 
This Subpart reports the core results for employment discrimination cases 
through both an unadjusted and an adjusted estimate of the change in the 
plaintiff1’s win rate following Twombly and Iqbal. The unadjusted estimates are 
based on the simple win rate for plaintiffs among observations in the analysis 
sample. The adjusted estimates are based on binary logit models.81 In these 
models, the outcome variable serves as a dummy variable equal either to one 
for a case wherein the plaintiff wins on a defense summary judgment motion 
(however a win is measured) or equal to zero if the plaintiff does not. The 
variable of primary interest is a dummy variable indicating whether the case 
was filed in the post-Iqbal period. The adjusted estimate of the change in the 
plaintiff1’s win rate following Twombly and Iqbal is calculated using the 
following three steps. First, the binary logit model is estimated. Second, for 
each observation the estimated coefficients from that model are used to 
calculate the estimated change in the plaintiff1’s win probability due to Twiqbal. 
Such an estimated change is commonly known as a “marginal effect” of a 
change in circumstances—here, the change in the pleading standard. Finally, 
these observation-specific estimated marginal effects are averaged over all cases 
in the relevant sample, yielding a single adjusted effect.82 Besides the Twiqbal 
 
 81. A binary logit model is a commonly used model for measuring the relationship 
between a binary outcome variable of interest—such as whether a motion was denied 
or not—and a set of predictor variables, such as the post-Iqbal dummy and the district 
court dummies.  
 82. Estimating a logit model yields estimated coefficients relating to each of the included 
predictor variables (the post-Iqbal dummy variable, plus the district court dummies). 
These coefficient estimates can then be used to estimate the probability that the 
footnote continued on next page 
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dummy variable, the other predictor variables—whose inclusion in the model 
is the source of the adjustment—are the following: 
 A dummy variable indicating whether the judge was appointed 
by a Republican President.83 
 A dummy variable indicating whether any defendant in the case 
was a business organization.84 
 The employment-to-population ratio for the year when the case 
was filed, in the state where the judicial district is located. 
 The employment-to-population ratio for each of the two years 
preceding the year in which the case was filed, in the state where 
the judicial district is located. 
 The population for the year when the case was filed, for the state 
where the judicial district is located. 
The appointing-President variable is meant to capture the effects of any 
ideological variation in judging, to the extent that such a variable does so.85 
The business organization variable is included to capture any effects of 
differences in party type. The employment-to-population variables are 
designed to control for business cycle variation that could have important 
effects on litigation behavior independent of Twombly and Iqbal.86 Finally, the 
population variable is included to control for the possibility that cases in bigger 
states might be systematically different from those in smaller districts. 
1. The percentage of cases in which plaintiffs win as to all challenged 
claims or issues 
This Subpart reports results for the percentage of cases in which plaintiffs 
win as to all challenged claims or issues. As the discussion to come will show, 
the results indicate that this measure of the plaintiff1’s win rate was lower 
 
plaintiff in each case would win against a defense summary judgment motion in each of 
the pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal periods. The difference in these estimated probabilities 
for a given case is the estimated value of the marginal effect of switching pleading 
standards. The average marginal effect is then the average of this estimate over all cases 
included in the analysis. That average value is what appears in the tables below. 
 83. My data on the judge assigned to the case are current as of the time that Thomson 
Reuters pulled the cases’ docket information from PACER. Since cases might have been 
reassigned from one judge to another between the time that summary judgment 
motions were adjudicated and the time when the docket information was retrieved, it 
is possible that the judge data are not entirely accurate.  
 84. I coded cases as having a defendant business organization if a defendant party’s name 
ended with the string “Inc” or “Corp” or included any of the following strings: “Inc.,” 
“Incorporated,” “Corp.,” “L.L.P.,” “LLP,” “Limited Liability Partnership,” “L.L.C.,” “LLC,” 
or “Limited Liability Company.” 
 85. See Gelbach, supra note 71, at 1673-75, for more discussion of why judicial ideology 
need not lead to predictable differences across cases in litigation behavior or outcomes. 
 86. For more on this issue, see Part V.B.1 below. 
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following Twiqbal. However, this drop in the plaintiff1’s win rate is estimated 
imprecisely, so that the results are not statistically significantly different from 
a zero effect. 
The first column of Table 3 reports percentages of employment 
discrimination cases, among those with summary judgment motions 
adjudicated within 731 days of case filing, in which the plaintiff won on all 
challenged claims. For the pre-Twombly sample, 18.3% of motions were denied 
as to all claims raised in the motions. For the post-Iqbal period, this figure was 
slightly lower, at 17.1%. Table 3’s second column reports estimated standard 
errors for these percentages, which are 1.8% and 2.0% respectively.  
The first column of Table 3’s third row reports information for the 
difference in the all-claims-denied percentage. This difference is -1.2%, 
nominally suggesting that case quality fell. However, the second column shows 
that the difference in win rates has an estimated standard error of 2.7%—great 
enough so that the difference is far from being statistically significantly 
different from zero.87 Another way to put this is via a 90% confidence interval 
for the change in the plaintiff1’s win rate against all challenged claims. This 
confidence interval, reported in the bottom row of Table 3, includes all values 
between a drop of 5.5% and an increase of 3.2%, which makes it clear that the 
results are not precise enough to allow us to conclude that Twiqbal caused 
either a drop or an increase in this measure of the plaintiff1’s win rate. 
 
Table 3 
Percentage of Cases in Which Plaintiffs Won on  
All Challenged Claims in Employment Discrimination Cases  
(among those with motions resolved in 731 or fewer days) 
 Unadjusted Adjusted*
 
Percentage 
Estimated 
Standard 
Error 
Percentage 
Estimated 
Standard 
Error 
Pre-Twombly 18.3 1.8  
Post-Iqbal 17.1 2.0   
Difference -1.2 2.7 -4.4 6.1 
90% CI [-5.5, 3.2]  [-14.4, 5.7]  
* A number of cases were dropped by the logit estimate’s statistical routine because of 
either missing data on the party of the President who appointed the judge or because 
 
 87. The p-value based on a standard t-test is 0.659, whereas conventional levels of 
significance in the social sciences would require a value less than 0.10. Note that the 
reported p-value is for a test of the null hypothesis of zero difference in the plaintiff1’s 
win rate, against the two-sided alternative of a change not equal to zero. The two-sided 
alternative is appropriate here since the supporters’ view predicts a positive difference, 
while the aggressive critics’ view predicts a negative difference. 
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these district courts have no variation in the plaintiff1’s win rate, preventing the 
inclusion of these observations in logit estimation. The adjusted estimates in this table 
are thus based on 968 observations, by comparison to 1068 observations in the 
unadjusted estimation. Unadjusted estimates calculated using only the 968 observations 
included in the logit estimation yielded a difference in the plaintiff1’s win rate of -0.8%, 
with an estimated standard error of 2.8%. 
 
The third and fourth columns show that adjusting for party of the 
appointing President, business status of defendants, state population, and 
trends in the state employment-to-population ratio leads to a substantially 
larger estimate of the change in the plaintiff1’s win rate—a drop of 4.4%. 
However, the adjusted difference is still quite far from being statistically 
significant: its estimated standard error is 6.1%, yielding a p-value well above 
conventional significance levels.88 The greater estimated standard error leads 
to an even wider 90% confidence interval, which includes all values between a 
drop of 14.4% and an increase of 5.7%. Thus the adjusted results also are not 
precise enough to allow us to conclude with typical levels of confidence that 
Twiqbal caused either a drop or an increase in this measure of the plaintiff1’s win 
rate. 
2. The percentage of cases in which plaintiffs win on at least one 
challenged claim 
This Subpart reports results for the percentage of cases in which plaintiffs 
win as to at least one challenged claim or issue. As the discussion to come 
indicates, the results indicate that this measure of the plaintiff1’s win rate was a 
bit higher following Twiqbal. However, this increase in the plaintiff1’s win rate 
is estimated imprecisely, so that the results are not statistically significantly 
different from a zero effect. The first column of Table 4 reports the percentages 
of claims on which plaintiffs won on at least one challenged claim in 
employment discrimination cases. For the pre-Twombly sample, plaintiffs won 
on at least one claim in 37.0% of cases. For the post-Iqbal period, this percentage 
was slightly greater, at 38.0%. The second column reports estimated standard 
errors for these percentages, which are 2.2% and 2.5% respectively. The 
unadjusted difference of 1.0% has an estimated standard error of 3.4% and is 
thus far from statistically significant. Table 4’s third row also reports 
information for the adjusted difference in the plaintiff1’s win rate. The 
difference of 2.7% is likewise statistically insignificant given its estimated 
standard error of 7.8%. Once again, another way of framing the statistical 
insignificance of the estimates is that 90% confidence intervals are wide enough 
to include zero for both the unadjusted and adjusted results. 
 
 88. The p-value, testing a null of zero effect against the two-sided alternative of nonzero 
effect, is 0.474. 
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Table 4 
Percentage of Cases in which Plaintiffs Won on  
at Least One Challenged Claim in Employment Discrimination Cases  
(among those with motions resolved in 731 or fewer days) 
 Unadjusted Adjusted* 
 
Percentage 
Estimated 
Standard 
Error 
Percentage 
Estimated 
Standard 
Error 
Pre-Twombly 37.0 2.2  
Post-Iqbal 38.0 2.5   
Difference 1.0 3.4 2.7 7.8 
90% CI [-4.5, 6.6]  [-10.2, 15.6]  
* A number of cases were dropped by the logit estimate’s statistical routine because of 
either missing data on the party of the President who appointed the judge or because 
these district courts have no variation in the plaintiff1’s win rate, preventing the 
inclusion of these observations in logit estimation. The adjusted estimates in this table 
are thus based on 968 observations, by comparison to 1068 observations in the 
unadjusted estimation. Unadjusted estimates calculated using only the 968 observations 
included in the logit estimation yielded a difference in the plaintiff1’s win rate of 0.8%, 
with an estimated standard error of 3.5%. 
3. Measuring the quality-filtering effect using changes in the 
number of employment discrimination cases facing summary 
judgment motions  
As discussed in Parts I.C and I.D, the percentage change in the number of 
cases facing summary judgment motions plays an important role in 
understanding the quality-filtering effect of Twiqbal. To measure this change 
for employment discrimination cases filed in each judicial district in each study 
period, this study compiled the number of cases that appeared to have a 
summary judgment motion filed via the search defined above in Part II. This is 
an imperfect method because some of the summary judgment motions would 
have been filed by plaintiffs rather than defendants. However, as discussed 
above, the overwhelming majority of summary judgment motions filed in 
employment discrimination cases are filed by defendants, so this method is 
reasonable for employment discrimination cases.89 Of the cases included in the 
 
 89. Recall that cases in the pre-Twombly period have been ongoing for four years longer 
than cases in the post-Iqbal period. While it is possible that the drop in the number of 
employment discrimination cases facing summary judgment motions is due partly to 
different case durations, that seems unlikely. If there were substantial censoring in the 
filing of summary judgment motions in the post-Iqbal period by comparison to the pre-
Twombly period, I would expect the share of cases with motions adjudicated before the 
731-day cutoff to be substantially greater in the post-Iqbal period than in the pre-
Twombly period. But as I wrote above in Part III.A, within each year, just below sixty 
footnote continued on next page 
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above analysis, docket sheets indicated that a summary judgment motion was 
filed in 2695 cases during the pre-Twombly study period. On the flip side, docket 
sheets indicated that 2218 cases filed in the post-Iqbal study period had such 
filings. Thus, the number of summary judgment motions filed in employment 
discrimination cases fell by 477 during the period. This is a drop of roughly 
18%, using the pre-Twombly study period as the denominator (477 ÷ 2695 = 
0.177).90 If we adopt the assumption that there was no selection into summary 
judgment, then as discussed above in Part I.C, the quality-filtering effect equals 
the ratio of the change in the plaintiff1’s win rate to the drop of 0.18 in the share 
of cases with summary judgment motions.91 Dividing by 0.18 is the same as 
multiplying by 5.6.92 For concreteness, this study employed a multiplication 
factor of 5.  
Finally, recall that under the assumption of no selection into summary 
judgment, the quality-filtering effect should be interpreted as the difference 
between the plaintiff1’s win rate among cases that would face summary 
judgment motions under both pleading standards and the plaintiff1’s win rate 
 
percent of cases had motions that had been adjudicated before the 731-day cutoff. I 
conclude that it is reasonable to compare the number of cases with summary judgment 
motions filed in the pre-2012 period, even though this allows four more years of 
observation time for cases filed in the pre-Twombly period. 
 90. One might worry that the recession affected litigation behavior, especially in 
employment discrimination cases. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Law and 
Macroeconomics: Employment Discrimination Litigation over the Business Cycle, 66 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 709, 710 (1993). To account for this possibility, I first calculated the number of 
cases with a summary judgment motion filed in the judicial districts of each state of the 
union, for each year of the study. I then used ordinary least squares to estimate a model 
relating the natural logarithm of the district-level number of cases to a dummy 
variable for the post-Iqbal period and the natural logarithm of the state’s population, as 
well as another model that also includes the log of the employment-to-population ratio 
in the year the case was filed, as well as two annual lags of this (logged) variable. The 
results of the first specification imply a value of the percentage drop in the number of 
cases with summary judgment motions filed of roughly 15%, which is highly 
statistically significantly different from zero. The second specification’s results imply a 
larger percentage drop—roughly 30%. However, the coefficients on the employment-
to-population variables are both individually and jointly insignificant in the second 
model, suggesting the economy is not significantly associated with changes in 
summary judgment incidence, and the coefficient on the post-Iqbal dummy variable is 
statistically insignificantly different from zero. Presumably the loss of precision in the 
post-Iqbal dummy’s coefficient, coupled with an increase in this estimated coefficient’s 
magnitude, is due to the addition of the employment-to-population variables, which 
vary greatly across the pre-Twombly/post-Iqbal period and thus chew up a substantial 
amount of the information in the post-Iqbal dummy. Thus the simpler approaches to 
estimating the percentage drop appear more credible than the second multivariate 
model. I therefore use the simple percentage drop of eighteen points, discussed in the 
main text above. 
 91. An 18% drop is a drop of 0.18. 
 92. The multiplicative inverse of 0.18 is 
.
5.6. 
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among cases that are filtered out; when the quality-filtering effect is positive, 
Twiqbal operates to filter out lower-quality cases, and vice versa.  
Table 5 reports estimated ranges for the quality-filtering effect that are 
consistent with various approaches to estimating the effect of Twombly and 
Iqbal on the plaintiff1’s win rate at summary judgment in employment 
discrimination cases. Table 5 reports ranges for both approaches to defining the 
plaintiff1’s win rate discussed in Table 3 (defining a plaintiff win as requiring 
the plaintiff to win on all challenged claims) and Table 4 (defining a plaintiff 
win as requiring the plaintiff to win only one challenged claim), in each case 
presenting ranges based both on unadjusted and adjusted-for-covariates 
estimation approaches. For each of the four approaches, the study presented 
herein reports both a lower bound and an upper bound on the quality-filtering 
effect. Each estimation method’s lower bound equals the multiplication factor 
of five, discussed above, times the lower bound of the 90% confidence interval 
for each method. The upper bound is calculated the same way except using the 
upper bound of the 90% confidence interval.  
Leaving the numerical particulars aside, the central message of Table 5 is 
that, even under the assumption of no selection into summary judgment, the 
data reported above are consistent with a wide range of quality-filtering effect 
values. The range in the first row and first two columns of the table were 
calculated using the approach in which a plaintiff must win on all challenged 
claims for the case to be considered high merit, with the unadjusted method of 
estimating the change in the plaintiff1’s win rate. This is the approach with the 
narrowest of the four bounding ranges. Following Twiqbal, plaintiffs won in 
17.1% of summary judgment motions. If the lower bound impact calculation in 
the first row and column of Table 5—a Twiqbal-caused drop of 28% in the 
plaintiff1’s win rate at summary judgment—were correct, then plaintiffs would 
have won in roughly 45% of filtered-out cases.93 Thus under the lower bound 
impact calculation, Twiqbal1’s quality-filtering effect would have caused the 
filtering out of cases with a high-merit share that is 28% higher than the high-
merit share among cases that would face summary judgment motions under 
both pleading standards. 
 
 
 93. Given a particular estimate of , the quality-filtering effect, we can back out the values 
of  and  under the assumption of no selection into summary judgment. Under 
that assumption, , so . When a plaintiff must win on all 
challenged claims for the case to be considered high merit and we use the unadjusted 
method of estimating the change in the plaintiff1’s win rate, we obtain an estimate of 
17.1%. If 28, then 17.1 28 45.1. This calculation implies that 
plaintiffs would have won at summary judgment on all claims in 45.1% of cases that 
were filtered out of summary judgment due to Twiqbal—by comparison to 17.1% in 
those cases whose summary judgment status is unaffected by Twiqbal.  
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Table 5 
Range of Quality-Filtering Effect Estimates for Employment Discrimination 
Cases, Assuming No Selection into Summary Judgment* 
Measure of Plaintiff ’s  
Win Rate 
Impact of Twiqbal on Plaintiff ’s Win-Rate 
Estimation Method
Unadjusted Adjusted 
Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Plaintiff wins on all 
challenged claims -28 16 -72 29 
     
Plaintiff wins on at least 
one challenged claim -23 33 -51 78 
* Bounds calculated by multiplying 90% confidence interval bounds in Table 3 and 
Table 4 by a multiplication factor of 5. 
 
Table 5 shows that the corresponding upper bound when a plaintiff must 
win on all challenged claims for the case to be considered high merit, again 
using the unadjusted estimation method, is a quality-filtering effect of 16%. If 
this figure is accurate, and if there is no selection into summary judgment, 
plaintiffs would have won at summary judgment on all claims in only 1% of 
the cases that were filtered out of summary judgment due to Twiqbal—by 
comparison to 17.1% in those cases whose summary judgment status is 
unaffected by Twiqbal.94  
Thus, even if we use the narrowest confidence interval in Table 5, we find 
that the data are consistent with a range of plaintiff1’s win rates of between 1% 
and 45% for the cases filtered out of summary judgment adjudication by 
Twiqbal. Given the observed plaintiff1’s win rate of 17.1% for cases not filtered 
out, this range is potentially consistent with any of the case-quality views held 
by Twiqbal1’s supporters or its critics, whether aggressive or moderate. And that 
means that, even under the assumption that there is no selection into summary 
judgment, the data on employment discrimination cases simply cannot settle 
the dispute over Twiqbal1’s quality-filtering effect: this empirical evidence is 
consistent with the position of partisans on all sides of the Twiqbal quality 
debate. 
IV. Contract Cases 
This Part of the Article reports the study’s empirical findings for contract 
cases. Subpart A discusses the details of the contract cases sample, while 
Subpart B discusses the empirical results for cases in this sample. On the whole, 
these results are similar to those for employment discrimination cases in that 
they indicate the plaintiff1’s win rate did not change in a statistically significant 
 
 94. If 12.8, then 17.1 12.8 4.3. 
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way following Twiqbal. As discussed below in Part IV.B.2, there is some weak 
statistical evidence of a statistically significant effect: with a plaintiff1’s win 
defined to include any case in which the plaintiff wins at summary judgment as 
to at least one challenged claim, the adjusted estimates yield an estimated 
increase in the plaintiff1’s win rate following Twiqbal that is statistically 
significant at the 90% level. For contextual reasons discussed in Part IV.B.3, 
though, this finding does not much alter the basic conclusion that Twiqbal did 
not have a clear and discernible effect on the plaintiff1’s win rate at summary 
judgment in contract cases. 
A. Basic Characteristics of the Contracts Sample 
Coders processed a total of 2478 contract cases. Of these, 236 were dropped 
because they originated in districts that had not adopted the ECF system before 
October 1, 2005.95 An additional 53 were dropped because at least one pro se 
plaintiff was involved in at least one motion for summary judgment,96 and 8 
more were dropped because coders indicated that at least one claim involved 
the ADA.97 That leaves 2181 contract cases with summary judgment motions 
in which all plaintiffs had legal representation. In 750 of these, there was no 
defendant’s summary judgment motion filed,98 so there were 1431 contract 
cases in which there were no pro se plaintiffs involved in any motion for 
summary judgment and at least one defense summary judgment motion was 
filed.99 Table 6 reports the breakdown of these 1431 cases across subtypes of 
contract suits: 48.2% (689 cases) involved insurance, 7.1% (103 cases) involved 
other enumerated types of cases, and the remaining 44.7% (639 cases) involved 
the “Other Contract” PACER category.  
 
  
 
 95. See supra note 71. 
 96. Concerning the rationale for excluding cases with pro se plaintiffs, see note 68 above. 
 97. See supra note 62. 
 98. As with employment discrimination cases, summary judgment motions filed by 
defendants in their capacity as either cross-claimants or counterclaimants were not 
treated as defense summary judgment motions.  
 99. Of the 2181 contract cases with summary judgment motions in which all plaintiffs 
were counseled, 85 had summary judgment motions filed only by a party classified as 
neither a plaintiff nor a defendant, and another 665 had summary judgment motions 
filed by plaintiffs but not defendants. Together, these two sets of cases make up the 750 
contract cases with summary judgment motions in which all plaintiffs were counseled, 
but in which no defense summary judgment motion was filed. The share of all  
contract cases with summary judgment motions in which all plaintiffs were    
counseled and in which a plaintiff filed a summary judgment motion thus was 36% 
(100% ), which is much greater than the rate for filing by plaintiffs                       
in employment discrimination cases. See supra note 79. 
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Table 6 
Served Contract Cases, by Individual Nature of Suit Code 
PACER Code Nature of Suit Number of Cases Served 
110 Insurance 689 
120 Marine 27 
130 Miller Act 4 
140 Negotiable Instrument 12 
150 Recovery of Overpayment and Enforcement of Judgment 10 
151 Medicare Act 15 
152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excluding Veterans) 1 
160 Stockholders’ Suits 5 
190 Other Contract 639 
195 Contract Product Liability 22 
196 Franchise 7 
 All Contract Cases 1431 
 
The first column of Table 7 reports the distribution of contract cases with 
a defense summary judgment motion and no pro se plaintiff by year (Panel A) 
and by pre-Twombly/post-Iqbal period (Panel B).100 There are somewhat more 
coded cases in the pre-Twombly period (758 cases) than in the post-Iqbal period 
(673 cases). This discrepancy arose because the coders worked on one year of 
cases at a time, and all coders had to stop working before they managed to code 
as many 2010 cases as 2006 cases.101 
 
  
 
 100. Unlike the employment discrimination sample, the contracts sample does not have a 
disproportionate number of cases included in the 2005 filing period because all relevant 
years of contract cases had been loaded into the database when the coders began coding 
these cases. 
 101. There were no qualitative changes in the results when the samples were weighted so 
that the 2005 and 2009, and 2006 and 2010, samples had the same effective number of 
cases. 
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Table 7 
Number of Contract Cases with Summary Judgment Motions  
Observed Filed, and with Adjudications Within 731 Days 
 
Defense Summary 
Filed in          
Observed Period
Judgment Motion 
Adjudicated     
Within 731 Days 
A. By year case filed 
2005 (Oct. 1—Dec. 31) 238 124 
2006 (1Jan. 1—Jun. 30) 520 276 
2009 (Oct. 1—Dec. 31) 254 144 
2010 (1Jan. 1—June 30) 419 237 
B. By pre-Twombly/post-Iqbal
Total, pre-Twombly 758 400 
Total, post-Iqbal 673 381 
 
The second column of Table 7 reports the number of the contract cases 
with any defense summary judgment motion filed that had at least one such 
motion adjudicated within 731 days of case filing. The discrepancy in the 
number of cases across the pre-Twombly/post-Iqbal periods was largely 
eliminated because the share of cases that were adjudicated within 731 days was 
greater in the post-Iqbal period (57%) than in the pre-Twombly period (53%). 
Overall, the pre-Twombly period had 400 contract cases with an adjudicated 
defense summary judgment motion, while the post-Iqbal period had 381. 
B. Summary Judgment Adjudication Results for Contract Cases 
1. The percentage of cases in which plaintiffs win as to all aspects 
raised by defense summary judgment motions  
Below, I will report results for the percentage of contract cases in which 
plaintiffs win as to all challenged claims or issues. As the discussion to come 
illustrates, the results indicate that this measure of the plaintiff1’s win rate was 
higher following Twiqbal. However, this increase in the plaintiff1’s win rate is 
estimated imprecisely, so that the results are not statistically significantly 
different from a zero effect. 
The first column of Table 8 reports the percentages of contract cases in 
which plaintiffs won on all claims challenged via a defense summary judgment 
motion. For the pre-Twombly sample, plaintiffs won on all challenged claims in 
36.3% of cases. For the post-Iqbal period, this figure was slightly greater, at 
37.3%. The table’s second column reports estimated standard errors for these 
percentages, which are 2.4% and 2.5% respectively.  
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Table 8 
Percentage of Cases in Which Plaintiffs Win on All Challenged Claims in 
Contract Cases (among those with motions resolved in 731 or fewer days) 
 Unadjusted Adjusted*
 
Percentage 
Estimated 
Standard 
Error
Percentage 
Estimated 
Standard 
Error 
Pre-Twombly 36.3 2.4  
Post-Iqbal 37.3 2.5   
Difference 1.0 3.5 6.2 7.0 
90% CI [-4.7, 6.7]  [-5.4, 17.7]  
* A number of cases were dropped by the logit estimate’s statistical routine because of 
either missing data on the party of the President who appointed the judge or because 
these district courts have no variation in the plaintiff1’s win rate, preventing the 
inclusion of these observations in logit estimation. The adjusted estimates in this table 
are thus based on 707 observations, by comparison to 781 observations in the 
unadjusted estimation. Unadjusted estimates calculated using only the 746 observations 
included in the logit estimation yielded a difference in the plaintiff1’s win rate of 0.1%, 
with an estimated standard error of 3.6%. 
 
Table 8’s next row reports information for the difference in the percentage 
of cases in which plaintiffs won on all challenged claims. The unadjusted 
increase of 1.0% is in line with the supporters’ view of Twombly and Iqbal, but 
this increase is very small. Moreover, its estimated standard error, 3.5%, is large 
enough that 90% confidence intervals include both positive and negative 
numbers. Once again, this difference is not statistically different from zero 
using either a two-sided102 or one-sided test of significance.103 The adjusted 
difference, which is based on the same logit model described above in Part III, is 
much larger, at 6.2%. However, this estimate is quite imprecise, with an 
estimated standard error of 7.0%, so that it, too, is statistically insignificant.104  
2. The percentage of cases in which plaintiffs win on at least one 
claim challenged via defense summary judgment motion 
The first column of Table 9 reports the percentages of contract cases in 
which the plaintiff won at summary judgment on at least one claim challenged 
 
 102. The p-value for a two-sided significance test is 0.768. 
 103. A one-sided alternative hypothesis is arguably appropriate for contract cases, since the 
aggressive critics’ concern that only defendants will have the information necessary to 
plead seems considerably less likely to hold in contract actions. Since the p-value for a 
one-sided significance test is 0.384, far above conventional levels for a finding of 
statistical significance, the type of alternative adopted is practically irrelevant. 
 104. This conclusion holds regardless of whether one uses a two- or one-sided alternative 
hypothesis. 
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by a defense summary judgment motion. For the pre-Twombly sample, the 
plaintiff won on at least one challenged claim in 52.0% of cases. For the post-
Iqbal period, this percentage was 56.4%. The second column reports estimated 
standard errors for these percentages, which are 2.5% in both periods. Table 9’s 
third row reports information for the difference in the denial percentage.  
The difference of 4.4% provides some support for the supporters’ view of 
Twombly and Iqbal, since it suggests that average merit increased. However, the 
difference has an estimated standard error of 3.6%, indicating that this 
difference, like those above, is not statistically significantly different from 
zero.105  
 
Table 9 
Percentage of Cases in Which Plaintiff Won on at Least One Claim in  
Contract Cases (among those with motions resolved in 731 or fewer days) 
 Unadjusted Adjusted* 
 
Percentage 
Estimated 
Standard 
Error
Percentage 
Estimated 
Standard 
Error 
Pre-Twombly 52.0 2.5  
Post-Iqbal 56.4 2.5  
Difference 4.4 3.6 13.6 7.0 
90% CI [-1.4, 10.3] [2.1, 25.2]  
*A number of cases were dropped by the logit estimate’s statistical routine because of 
either missing data on the party of the President who appointed the judge or because 
these district courts have no variation in the plaintiff1’s win rate, preventing the 
inclusion of these observations in logit estimation. The adjusted estimates in this table 
are thus based on 707 observations, in comparison to 781 observations in the 
unadjusted estimation. Unadjusted estimates calculated using only the 707 observations 
included in the logit estimation yielded a difference in the plaintiff1’s win rate of 3.5%, 
with an estimated standard error of 3.8%. 
 
The final contracts results appear in the third and fourth columns of 
Table 9. The adjusted difference, in the third column, indicates that after 
adjustments are made for measures related to the judge, for the business 
organization status of defendants, and for state population and business       
cycle variables, Twombly and Iqbal are associated with a 13.6% increase in         
the plaintiff1’s win rate. This estimated difference in the plaintiff1’s win rate       
is statistically significantly different from zero, using either a two-sided 
(p‑value = 0.052) or one-sided (p-value = 0.026) alternative hypothesis.106 
 
 105. Even the one-sided p-value for this estimate is 0.108, above the cutoff level of 0.10 
necessary for a finding of statistical significance. 
 106. See note 103 above for an explanation of why a one-sided test is arguably appropriate 
for contract cases. 
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Moreover, the point estimate is quite sizable: 13.6% amounts to nearly a 25% 
increase over the pre-Twombly plaintiff1’s win rate of 52.0% (see the first row of 
the first column in Table 9). Thus, using the conventional approach to 
significance testing, the results for contract cases do provide some evidence 
that the quality of cases adjudicated at summary judgment was greater 
following Twiqbal than before. 
3. Challenges in measuring the quality-filtering effect using changes 
in the number of contract cases facing summary judgment 
motions  
As I discussed above in Part I.C conceptually, and in Part III.B as applied to 
employment discrimination cases, the change in the number of cases facing a 
defendant’s summary judgment motion plays an important role in 
understanding the quality-filtering effect of Twiqbal. Among contract cases 
with at least one summary judgment motion, there is no defendant-filed 
motion in more than a third.107 Moreover, an initial review of the coded data 
suggests that this fraction might have been greater in the post-Iqbal period than 
in the pre-Twombly period. Thus, it seems considerably more problematic to 
use pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal counts of the number of cases with summary 
judgment motions filed, as this study did for employment discrimination cases 
in Part III.B, to measure the change in the number of cases with defendant-filed 
summary judgment motions.  
For the sake of discussion, the analysis here ignores that concern and 
assumes that the number of cases with a defendant-filed summary judgment 
motion is proportional to the number of cases with any summary judgment 
motion. Under this assumption, the percentage drop in the number of cases 
with any summary judgment motion (regardless of which party filed it) will 
equal the percentage drop in the number of cases with a defendant-filed 
summary judgment motion (our drop of interest). 
Using the search defined above in Part II to count the number of contract 
cases filed in the districts included in this study that appeared to have at least 
one summary judgment motion filed, there were 3127 such cases in the pre-
Twombly period and 3005 in the post-Iqbal period. These figures imply a 3.9% 
drop, whose inverse—which is the multiplication factor discussed above in  
Part III.B.3—is roughly 25.108 Thus under the assumption that there was no 
selection into summary judgment, the difference in the plaintiff1’s win rate 
among filtered-out cases and those that would face defense summary judgment 
motions under both pleading standards would equal 25 times whatever 
“difference” measure we choose from Table 8 or Table 9.  
 
 107. See supra note 99. By comparison, there are precious few employment discrimination 
cases in which only plaintiffs file summary judgment motions. 
 108. That is, 0.039, and 
.
25.6. 
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Consider the first column of Table 8,109 whose estimated difference of 1% 
has an associated 90% confidence interval that includes all difference values 
between a drop of 4.7% and an increase of 6.7%. Multiplying each of these 
figures by 25 would suggest a confidence interval that includes all values 
between a drop of more than 100 points and an increase of more than 100 
points.110 But the maximum logically possible difference in the plaintiff1’s win 
rate between any two sets of cases is 100 points in either direction. This means 
that even when we impose the assumption of no selection into summary 
judgment, the results involved in the first column of Table 8 are entirely 
uninformative about Twiqbal1’s quality-filtering effect for contract cases.  
The same argument applies to the second column of Table 8 as well, and a 
variation on it applies to the first column of Table 9. Thus, if we were to adopt 
any of these measures of the observed change in the plaintiff1’s win rate against 
defense summary judgment motions, then even under the assumption of no 
selection into summary judgment we should conclude that the data for 
contract cases are consistent with such a wide range of results that they are 
uninformative about Twiqbal1’s quality-filtering effects. 
Now consider the remaining results in the second column of Table 9. It is 
impossible for Twiqbal to have increased the plaintiff1’s win rate against defense 
summary judgment motions by the reported 13.6% if both (i) there was no 
selection into summary judgment and (ii) only 3.9% of cases were filtered out of 
facing defense summary judgment motions: 13.6 points times the 
multiplication factor of 25 exceeds 100 points, which is the maximum logically 
possible quality-filtering effect. In fact, it can be shown that a filtered-out share 
of 3.9% would be consistent with the absence of selection into summary 
judgment only if the actual effect of Twiqbal on the plaintiff1’s win rate against 
defense summary judgment motions is roughly 2%—the very bottom of the 
90% confidence interval reported in the second column of Table 9.111 
 
 109. In this Table, a plaintiff is considered to have won against a defense summary judgment 
motion only if she wins on all challenged claims; the first column uses the unadjusted 
approach to measuring the change in the plaintiff1’s win rate resulting from Twiqbal. 
 110. That is, 25 4.7 is more than 100, as is 25 6.7. 
 111. Under the assumption of no selection into summary judgment, the plaintiff1’s win    
rate against defense summary judgment motions before Twombly can be written as         
a weighted average of the win rate among filtered out cases and the win rate among 
cases that would face summary judgment motions under both pleading standards.  
With 3.9% of cases having been filtered out by Twiqbal, as discussed above, we have: 
0.039	 	 0.961	 	 . In the most extreme situation, plaintiffs would 
win in none of the filtered out cases, so that 0. That would imply              
	 0.961.  
footnote continued on next page 
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Thus, unless the adjusted estimates in the second column of Table 9 are 
greatly overstated, there must have been some selection into summary 
judgment. If that is so, then the quality-filtering effect cannot be isolated using 
the data discussed here.112 As a result, even if there really was a quality 
improvement, it likely is due at least in part, and potentially in total, to the 
replacement of relatively low-quality filtered-out cases by cases that have 
selected into summary judgment due to Twiqbal. It is difficult to assess the 
welfare implications of such a result. First, while the filtered-out cases would 
be lower quality than those selected into summary judgment, there is no way 
to know whether filtered-out cases were lower quality than those that face 
summary judgment motions under both pleading standards. Second, the result 
would imply that a relatively substantial number of high-quality cases that 
would settle prediscovery but for Twiqbal instead are going through discovery, 
and then summary judgment adjudication. At the very least, such a result seems 
inconsistent with Twiqbal1’s meta-policy rationale related to reducing litigation 
costs. 
In sum, the results for contract cases do not paint any clearer a picture than 
those for employment discrimination cases. On the one hand, there is some 
evidence that Twiqbal caused an increase in the quality of contract cases that 
 
  From the first row and column of Table 9, we know that plaintiffs win 52.0% of the 
time pre-Twombly, so 0.52. Thus,  is no greater than 0.52 0.961, or 0.54. 
Thus the maximum quality-filtering effect is W 0.54 0 0.54. 
Dividing this by the multiplication factor of 25 yields a result of roughly 2% for the 
maximum possible change in the observed plaintiff1’s win rate that is consistent with 
both (i) no selection into summary judgment and (ii) a filtered out share of 3.9%. This 
same argument applies even if the filtered out share of cases is, say, 8%. In that case, the 
maximum possible change in the observed plaintiff1’s win rate that is consistent with 
no selection into summary judgment is below 5%—still far below the point estimate in 
the second column of Table 9. 
  Perhaps one should not make too much of the statistical significance of the result in the 
second column of Table 9 in the first place. There are four different models estimated 
for contract cases (two in each of Table 8 and Table 9). It is well known in statistics that 
when a researcher conducts what are known as multiple inferences—here, the 
construction of four confidence intervals—the standard confidence interval bounds are 
too narrow. The norm in much social science scholarship, and also in empirical legal 
studies, is simply to ignore this fact. I shall largely follow that norm here, as it is 
complicated to explain how to construct confidence intervals that properly account for 
multiple inferences. However, it takes little gumption to conjecture that the one 90% 
confidence interval in these tables that doesn’t include zero—the one statistically 
significant result—would not likely be deemed statistically significant once multiple 
inferences are taken into account. 
 112. The example considered in note 58 above shows that when there is no change in the 
number of cases with summary judgment motions filed, the observed difference in the 
plaintiff1’s win rate equals . However, there is no way to separately identify 
the part of this difference that is due to , which measures the extent of selection into 
summary judgment, and the part that is due to , which is the difference in 
case quality between cases that select into and that are filtered out of summary 
judgment. 
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survive through to the summary judgment stage. On the other hand, this 
evidence is relatively weak in context.113 Further, it appears likely that there 
was selection into summary judgment in contract cases, which would defeat 
our ability to draw meaningful inferences limited to Twiqbal1’s quality-filtering 
effect.  
V. Further Issues 
This Part discusses some additional methodological issues. First, this Part 
discusses why it would be problematic to focus only on cases in which a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion was filed, as one other recent paper does in its assessment 
of Twiqbal1’s performance as a filter for summary judgment. Second, this Part 
discusses a number of factors that might render the estimates presented above 
unreliable as measures of Twiqbal1’s overall causal effect on the change in the 
plaintiff1’s win rate against defense summary judgment motions: the recession; 
the Supreme Court’s resolution of the Ledbetter case and its subsequent override 
by Congress; Scott v. Harris; amendments to Rule 56 that took effect in 2007, 
2009, and 2010; changes in primary behavior; and the possibility of other 
confounding factors. 
A. Why It Would Be Problematic to Focus Only on Cases in Which a 
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion Was Filed 
As mentioned in the Introduction, there is one other paper that attempts to 
draw inferences concerning Twiqbal1’s effects on case quality. Alexander 
Reinert read and coded information related to the resolution of Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions in more than 4000 cases.114 Most of his paper is directed at comparing 
the rate of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals before Twombly and after Iqbal.115 But 
Reinert also includes a section titled, “Plausibility Pleading as Filter?”116 There, 
he reports the “ultimate outcome” of cases after adjudication of an initial Rule 
12(b)(6) motion.117 One of the categories of ultimate outcomes he considers is 
“Dismissed ([Summary Judgment]).”118  
 
 113. See supra note 111. 
 114. Reinert, supra note 7, at 2121. 
 115. Id. For critical discussions of such an approach to measuring the impact of changes in 
pleading standards, see Gelbach, Dark Arts, supra note 10, at 246-48; and Gelbach, 
Locking the Doors to Discovery?, supra note 10, at 2311-16. 
 116. Reinert, supra note 6, at 2162 (italics omitted). 
 117. Id. at 2164 tbl.12 (bolding omitted) (capitalization altered). It is potentially meaningful 
to follow up even those cases in which the initial Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, 
because in some cases plaintiffs receive leave to amend their complaints even after a 
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. 
 118. Id. 
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Reinert’s analysis in that section differs from the one presented here in 
three key ways. First, he does not account for the fact that cases in the pre-
Twombly period are more likely to have had time to reach a definitive result 
than cases filed in the post-Iqbal period, simply due to the fact that the pre-
Twombly cases were filed earlier.119 For this reason, his summary judgment 
dismissal comparisons might be skewed due to the longer follow-up period 
available for cases filed in his pre-Twombly period.120 Second, Reinert does not 
report the share of cases that are challenged via summary judgment, which is 
enough to render his results and mine noncomparable. 
Third, and possibly most importantly, Reinert’s study design focuses only 
on cases in which a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is filed. It might seem that this 
approach usefully focuses attention where it is warranted. But that view is 
mistaken. Consider a defendant-selection case, which the defendant would 
answer if the Conley standard applied but would challenge with a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion if instead the Twiqbal standard applied.121 If the study presented here 
considered only cases in which a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is filed and denied, then 
the post-Twiqbal sample would include those cases in which the defendant loses 
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and then files for summary judgment. But the pre-
Twiqbal sample would exclude such cases. Defendant selection cases thus would 
be represented in the post-Twiqbal sample, but not the pre-Twiqbal sample. If 
case quality is correlated in important ways with changes in parties’ litigation 
choices, as it might be, then this sample-definition rule would induce 
noncomparability across the two periods.  
There are other selection-related types of cases that also make Reinert’s 
approach to comparing ultimate outcomes problematic. Here is another 
example: Pre-Twiqbal, the parties agree that the defendant would be unlikely to 
win a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and none would be filed. The parties disagree 
enough on the case’s merits, however, such that rather than settle, the 
defendant would answer, allowing the case to go to discovery, and then move 
for summary judgment. Under the Twiqbal pleading standard, the parties in 
this same case would expect the defendant to file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and to 
have a substantial probability of winning on it. Rather than spend the 
resources necessary to litigate this motion, the parties would settle even before 
the answer/Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Such a case would yield the opposite result to 
 
 119. As discussed above in note 67, my main focus is on only those summary judgment 
motions that are adjudicated within 731 days of case filing in order to avoid differential 
follow-up periods. 
 120. Indeed, the share of cases in Reinert’s “Unresolved” category for cases filed in his post-
Iqbal period dwarfs the corresponding share in his pre-Twombly period. Reinert, supra 
note 7, at 2164 tbl.12. 
 121. See Gelbach, Dark Arts, supra note 10, at 228; Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery?, 
supra note 10, at 2307. 
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the defendant selection example discussed just before it: the second case would 
be represented in the pre-Twiqbal sample, but not the post-Twiqbal sample.  
These examples show that it is problematic to measure Twiqbal1’s case-
quality effects using only cases in which Rule 12(b)(6) motions are filed. Such an 
approach unavoidably introduces the possibility of noncomparable samples in 
the pre-Twiqbal and post-Twiqbal periods. 
B. Threats to the Validity of the Empirical Approach 
1. The recession 
Earlier empirical work has suggested that the characteristics of 
employment discrimination cases differ over the business cycle.122 It seems 
reasonable to think that contract disputes, or simply undisputed breaches, 
might also be more likely during economic downturns, with some parties 
being less able to perform than they had anticipated at the time they formed 
the contracts. As it happens, the worst recession in six decades gripped the 
United States in the period between the pre-Twiqbal and post-Twiqbal study 
periods. Thus, it is reasonable to worry that changes in the economy might 
have had important effects on the incidence of disputes, the filing of civil suits, 
or the nature of litigation.123 
It is for this reason that both the contemporaneous employment-to-
population variable and one- and two-year lags were included in this study to 
account for the fact that lawsuits need not be filed immediately. It is certainly 
possible that this approach fails to capture important aspects of the business 
cycle, but the employment-to-population ratio seems as good a measure as any. 
Unlike the unemployment rate, the employment-to-population ratio does not 
move in the direction of “good economic news” when more workers become so 
discouraged that they drop out of the labor force altogether.124 Further, by 
including both the contemporaneous employment-to-population ratio and two 
annual lags, this study is able to account for not just the current level, but also 
ongoing trends in labor market conditions in the state where a district court is 
located. 
 
 122. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 90, at 710. 
 123. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil 
Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1212 (2013) (suggesting a need to take the business 
cycle seriously in discussing a very early version of the results presented in the present 
study). 
 124. The unemployment rate is vulnerable to such changes because its denominator 
includes only those looking for work. Thus when workers become discouraged, all else 
equal, the unemployment rate rises. In contrast, the denominator of the employment-
to-population ratio is unaffected by such changes as long as unemployed people do not 
move out of state. 
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2. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair 
Pay Act 
The functioning of the Title VII statute of limitations was in a state of 
some flux between the two study periods considered here. In 2007, the Supreme 
Court held that the Title VII statute of limitations does not reset following an 
initial act of employment discrimination.125 Congress overrode this holding in 
2009, retaining the six-month statute of limitations but allowing it to reset 
with each new paycheck embodying a discriminatory act.126 
It is possible that these changes caused differences in the number and 
composition of employment discrimination cases filed in the pre-Twiqbal and 
post-Twiqbal periods of study, but I am unaware of other empirical Twiqbal 
studies that have considered this possibility. Of course, the general failure of 
the literature to consider this issue might simply have been an oversight. 
Unfortunately, aside from controlling for business cycle fluctuations, there 
does not appear to be a good strategy for overcoming any bias potentially 
caused by this change. However, the circuit split that the Supreme Court 
addressed in Ledbetter appears to have involved only the Eleventh Circuit’s 
earlier resolution of Ledbetter itself, on the one hand, and the D.C. Circuit and 
the Second Circuit, on the other.127 Both the Second Circuit and the D.C. 
Circuit cases involved in this split were decided in 2005, so it is possible that 
there was relatively little on-the-ground awareness of this issue before 
Ledbetter. Moreover, the quick override of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Ledbetter—President Obama signed the legislation in a high-profile ceremony 
less than two weeks after taking office128—meant that the law on this issue was 
nationally uniform well before my post-Twiqbal study period. 
3. Scott v. Harris 
In Scott v. Harris, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s denial of 
summary judgment to a police officer who rammed his car into the subject of a 
high-speed car chase.129 In holding that the officer’s use of force was reasonable, 
 
 125. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 625 (2007). 
 126. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5-6 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (2014)). 
 127. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 623 (explaining the grant of certiorari as occurring “[i]n light of 
disagreement among the Courts of Appeals as to the proper application of the 
limitations period in Title VII disparate-treatment pay cases” and contrasting  
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2005), with     
Forsyth v. Federation Employment & Guidance Service, 409 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2005), and 
Shea v. Rice, 409 F.3d 448 (D.C. Cir. 2005), for this proposition). 
 128. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y. TIMES (1Jan. 29, 2009), 
http://nyti.ms/1JJh7jy. 
 129. 550 U.S. 372, 376 (2007). 
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the Court relied on a videotape of the car chase.130 The Court held that the 
videotape so thoroughly discredited the plaintiff1’s account of events that only 
an unreasonable jury would find for him.131 Even though courts handling 
summary judgment motions usually construe all facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmovant, the Court held that when confronting the 
particular facts of Scott v. Harris, courts “should not adopt [the discredited] 
version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment.”132 
Scott v. Harris was handed down three weeks before Twombly, so most of 
the summary judgment motions considered in my pre-Twiqbal period were 
filed before Scott. While pending motions could have been affected by Scott, it is 
clear that more cases in the post-Twiqbal period would be affected. Thus, if Scott 
created substantial change in district courts’ summary judgment practice, it 
would also render the two periods noncomparable for purposes of summary 
judgment adjudication.  
This seems unlikely, however, because the factual predicate for Scott1’s 
applicability is unusual. Few cases can be expected to involve a documentary 
record that directly and, according to the Supreme Court, inarguably 
controverts testimonial evidence that would be the only evidence a 
nonmovant could provide.133 Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court’s 8-1 
majority says as much, characterizing the videotape’s role in Scott as “an added 
wrinkle.”134 In his concurrence, Justice Breyer refers to the Court’s 
determination concerning the underlying Fourth Amendment issue at stake in 
the case as “highly fact-dependent.”135 While it is possible that Scott might 
signal the Supreme Court’s approval of lower courts’ use of added discretion at 
summary judgment, it seems at least as likely that the case’s impact on the great 
mass of summary judgment motions is quite limited,136 especially in the two 
substantive areas considered here. 
 
 130. Id. at 383-84. 
131. Id. at 380. 
 132. Id.  
 133. See id. at 380-81 (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is 
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court 
should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment. . . . Respondent’s version of events is so utterly discredited by the 
record that no reasonable jury could have believed him. The Court of Appeals . . . 
should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.”). 
 134. Id. at 378. 
 135. Id. at 387 (Breyer, J., concurring). It is worth noting that Justice Stevens issued a spirited 
dissent. See id. at 389-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 136. See Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1863 (2014) (per curiam) (vacating the Fifth 
Circuit’s affirmance of the grant of a defendant’s summary judgment motion for 
having “failed to adhere to the axiom that in ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment, ‘[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable 
footnote continued on next page 
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4. Amendments to Rule 56 
Following 1986’s famed trilogy of summary judgment cases,137 Rule 56 was 
amended in 1987 and then left untouched by the Advisory Committee for 
twenty years. There were then three amendments in as many years, with 
changes taking effect on December 1 of 2007, 2009, and 2010. The 2007 
amendment was part of an overall restyling project, which was intended to 
clarify the Rules without changing the actual meaning of any of the Rules.138 
The 2009 amendment “consolidated and substantially revised” the timing 
provisions for Rule 56, allowing parties to file summary judgment motions 
earlier than before.139 The 2010 amendment revised various aspects of “the 
procedures for presenting and deciding summary-judgment motions . . . to 
make the procedures more consistent with those already used in many 
courts.”140 It also restored the word “shall,” which had been replaced by 
“should” as part of the 2007 restyling project, and replaced “no genuine issue” 
with “no genuine dispute.”141 However, the Advisory Committee’s note for the 
2010 amendment states that “[t]he standard for granting summary judgment 
remains unchanged” and that the “amendments will not affect continuing 
development of the decisional law construing and applying these phrases.”142 
By the Advisory Committee’s own lights, then, nothing important about the 
incidence and ultimate results of summary judgment adjudication should have 
 
inferences are to be drawn in his favor’” (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986))). 
 137. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. 242; Matsushita Elec. 
Indus., Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).  
 138. See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Restyling the Civil Rules: Clarity Without Change, 79 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1761, 1761 (2004) (characterizing “the goal of the Style Project” as being 
“to translate present text into clear language that does not change the meaning”). 
 139. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note to 2009 amendment. 
 140. Id. 56 advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment. 
 141. Id. Before the 2010 Amendment to Rule 56, Rule 56(c) stated that “[t]he judgment sought 
should be rendered if . . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (West 2009) 
(emphasis added). After 2010, the relevant language, now found in Rule 56(a), is “[t]he 
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (emphasis added). According to the Advisory Committee’s 
note to the 2010 amendment: 
The word “shall” in Rule 56 acquired significance over many decades of use. Rule 56 was 
amended in 2007 to replace “shall” with “should” as part of the Style Project, acting under a 
convention that prohibited any use of “shall.” Comments on proposals to amend Rule 56, as 
published in 2008, have shown that neither of the choices available under the Style Project 
conventions—“must” or “should”—is suitable in light of the case law on whether a district 
court has discretion to deny summary judgment when there appears to be no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact. 
  Id. 56 advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment. 
 142. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment. 
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changed due to the amendments interposed between my pre-Twiqbal and post-
Twiqbal periods. 
5. Changes in primary behavior  
Some fear that due to the catch-22 problem, Twiqbal will “create an 
undesirable safe harbor that effectively places some defendants beyond the 
reach of civil rights laws,”143 with an increased amount of unlawful 
discrimination as one possible result. Alternatively, it is possible to construct 
examples in which employers are dissuaded from implementing employment 
policies that would be lawful, if adjudicated on the merits, because the 
employers fear plaintiffs will file suit alleging unlawful disparate impact. If 
employers expect the shift to Twiqbal to make it easier to get such lawsuits 
dismissed earlier and at lower cost, then employers might institute the policies 
in the first place.144 These are examples of Twiqbal-induced changes in primary 
behavior that could lead to changes in the number and quality of lawsuits filed. 
Such changes could render the estimation approach used here invalid. Thus, 
this Article’s approach relies on the assumption that any such primary 
behavior changes must have been small enough so as not to have importantly 
changed the distribution of cases over the relevant period studied here. 
6. Other factors that might lead to invalid estimates 
The recession, the Ledbetter case and its override, Scott v. Harris, and 
amendments to Rule 56 are all identifiable reasons why one might worry about 
comparing plaintiffs’ win rates in cases filed in the pre-Twiqbal and post-
Twiqbal periods. Even if one accepts my arguments for concluding that the 
present study is not importantly affected by these issues, it is possible that some 
other, heretofore unaddressed factors unrelated to changes in the pleading 
standard might have affected plaintiffs’ win rates in these two study periods. 
Such concerns are an unavoidable part of attempting to draw causal inferences 
from real-world data when the variables of interest are not under researchers’ 
control.145 
 
 143. CIVIN & ADEGBILE, supra note 28, at 2. 
 144. This example is drawn from Jonah B. Gelbach, Selection in Motion: A Formal Model of 
Rule 12(b)(6) and the Twombly-Iqbal Shift in Pleading Policy 43 (Aug. 29, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 145. One consequence is that there has been a movement among legal scholars in favor of 
“randomizing law.” See Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 
929, 933 (2011) (arguing that where it is feasible to do so, legal rules should be 
randomized in order to facilitate measurement of policies’ effects). For a article 
focusing on the patent law context, see Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent 
Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65 (2015). As Abramowicz and his coauthors 
acknowledge, though, randomization is not always feasible, and it does have 
drawbacks. Abramowicz et al., supra, at 948-74. Consequently, recommendations for 
randomizing wherever possible are actually controversial among empirically oriented 
footnote continued on next page 
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One approach that is often advocated, and nearly as often used, is to draw 
an analogy to medical trials with the units of empirical interest conceptualized 
as an experimental “treatment group.” Causal inferences are then based on 
finding a comparison group that is supposed to be entirely similar to the 
treatment group aside from exposure to some treatment of interest.146 In the 
present situation, the “treatment” is the post-Twiqbal pleading standard. So the 
treatment group is the set of all cases exposed to this treatment—including 
both my employment discrimination and contract cases. 
Since Twombly and Iqbal apply transsubstantively due to the 
transsubstantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,147 precious few 
comparison groups are conceivable. One example involves securities litigation. 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)148 prescribes a 
pleading standard that applies only to certain securities cases, requiring that a 
complaint’s allegations raise more than a plausible inference as to relevant 
elements.149 Since Twombly and Iqbal purport to interpret only Rule 8 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they should not have affected the pleading 
standard that applies to the relevant cases covered by the PSLRA. Thus, one 
possibility would be to use these securities cases as a comparison group.  
 
economists, with some highly influential scholars emphasizing the problems with an 
exclusive focus on randomization as the basis for credible empirical work. See, e.g., 
Angus Deaton, Instruments, Randomization, and Learning About Development, 48 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 424, 426 (2010); James J. Heckman & Jeffrey A. Smith, Assessing the Case for 
Social Experiments, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 85, 86 (1995). For more on issues related to 
randomization in the empirical law and economics context in particular, see Jonah B. 
Gelbach & Jonathan Klick, Empirical Law and Economics, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF   
LAW & ECONOMICS (Francesco Parisi ed., forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2507324. 
 146. Researchers often refer to the comparison group as a “control group.” This practice is 
unfortunate, because the whole problem in a nonexperimental study is that assignment 
to the treatment is not controlled by the researcher. Thus it is an abuse of analogy to use 
the term “control group.” 
 147. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the 
pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’ . . . [including] antitrust and discrimination suits 
alike.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)). 
148. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.). 
 149. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2014) (requiring the plaintiff to plead with particularity in 
the complaint when alleging that the defendant untruthfully stated a material fact or 
omitted a material fact necessary to make a statement not misleading); id. § 78u-
4(b)(2)(A) (stating that when recovery of money damages requires proof of the 
defendant’s state of mind, “the complaint shall . . . state with particularity facts giving 
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind”); see 
also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007) (interpreting a 
“strong inference” in § 78u-4(b)(2) to mean that “an inference of scienter must be more 
than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any 
opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent”). 
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However, this approach seems unlikely to generate fruitful results. There 
are surely many, many differences between the archetypal employment 
discrimination (or contract) case, on the one hand, and even the typical 
securities fraud case, on the other. Many employment discrimination cases are 
relatively simple affairs, involving a single plaintiff, and such cases need not 
involve much procedural wrangling other than the adjudication of 
straightforward Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 motions. By comparison, securities 
fraud litigation typically involves an effort to certify a class under Rule 23, and 
many of these cases become very complicated and drawn out. Thus, the effects 
of changes in procedural law might be quite difficult to identify. In sum, there 
is little reason to believe that securities fraud cases constitute a comparison 
group that is entirely similar to the treatment group aside from exposure to 
some treatment of interest, as required to draw any meaningful inferences 
from such an approach. 
Conclusion 
This Article investigates the effects of Twombly and Iqbal on the quality of 
cases that face summary judgment motions filed by defendants. The 
methodological discussion shows that, under the assumption that the Twiqbal 
pleading standard does not cause any selection into summary judgment, the 
views of both Twiqbal supporters and critics line up cleanly with the direction 
of change in the plaintiff1’s win rate against defense summary judgment 
motions. The analysis also reveals how, again under the assumption of no 
selection into summary judgment, one can use observable data to compare the 
quality of cases that are filtered out of summary judgment as a result of Twiqbal 
with the quality of cases that would face summary judgment motions under 
both pleading standards. The results suggest that even with the relatively 
strong assumption related to selection into summary judgment, and even with 
usable data on nearly 2000 cases, it is not possible to clearly determine the 
quality-filtering effects of Twiqbal. The data are consistent with the positions of 
all three views described above—supporters, aggressive critics, and moderate 
critics. This finding suggests the disappointing, but nevertheless real, prospect 
that it might not be possible to settle the controversy over Twiqbal1’s quality-
filtering effects using empirical evidence. 
